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Good morning everyone. I am pleased to be here as part of this exciting
International Law Weekend to participate with my good friend and Rocky
Mountains colleague, Professor Nanda, along with Professor Wojcik, to discuss
this important topic of The Responsibility to Protect Victims of Genocide, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. I have four main points. First, I believe
international law imposes a legal duty and responsibility on all nations, as well
as the UN Security Council, to protect these victims and prevent such atrocities.
Second, I do not believe national sovereignty bars the exercise of this duty and
responsibility even when the Security Council fails to authorize such action, in
appropriate circumstances. Third, the International Commission on Interven-
tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has defined such circumstances with enough
clarity for states to act, unilaterally if necessary, and multilaterally otherwise.
Fourth, this duty must be exercised effectively by any and all means designed
to achieve success, rather than with symbolic gestures having no chance of
success and likely to exacerbate tragedy. Let me now address each of these
points more fully.
The duty and responsibility to protect targeted victims of genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and indeed, to prevent these atrocities
from occurring, can be found in multiple international law instruments
explicitly or by reasonable inference. The several Geneva Conventions, the
Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights plus various
regional human rights conventions, and the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights all recognize the rights of innocent people to be free from
atrocities conducted either in armed conflicts, or under more covert
circumstances where states lend support to unofficial illegal acts or, at times,
are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from their occurrence.
* David Aronofsky has been The University of Montana General Counsel and an adjunct law
faculty member teaching various international law and other courses since 1994, after practicing international
law at a major Washington, D.C. firm for 12 years. He received his J.D. from the University of Texas at
Austin. The remarks here reflect solely his own views and not those of the University of Montana or the
University of Montana School of Law.
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Without effective military intervention by states willing and able to enforce
these rights, however, the rights themselves become meaningless. I refuse to
believe proponents of these instruments, which form the bedrock of today's
international law, intended them to be meaningless. The UN General Assembly
addressed this issue directly in Resolution 3074, Paragraph 3 requiring states
to "co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis with a view
to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity" and
obligating states to "take the domestic and international measures necessary for
that purpose."' More recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1674 adopted
April 28, 2006 expressly recognized a legal responsibility to protect civilians
in times of conflict.2  Resolution 1674 reflects a major international law
breakthrough regarding the protection duty principle.
As to my second point, I do not see national sovereignty as a barrier to
protective intervention because in my view, states effectively waive their
national sovereignty when they commit, facilitate the commission of, or fail to
protect their populations against atrocities. Those interested in reviewing the
legal pros and cons of humanitarian intervention undertaken to protect
populations from atrocities should read Professor Rogers' excellent analysis.4
I have formed my own opinion on this issue and join those who favor
intervention at the expense of sovereignty. Can anyone seriously make a
credible legal case for defending Sudanese national sovereignty to allow Darfur
murders and ethnic cleansing?
Last Spring, I participated with Professor Nanda in a Rocky Mountain anti-
genocide conference focusing heavily on Darfur, and as various speakers there
pointed out, Darfur atrocities have continued all but unabated for at least 30
years. I recall working on a Darfur-related refugee case in my own law practice
about 20 years ago. In my view no legitimate sovereign permits or commits this
kind of prolonged systemic international law violation, nor should any
sovereign be allowed to do so. Professor King, and also this ILSA Journal, have
aptly written that since the Nuremberg Principles, states in these circumstances
effectively waive sovereignty as a defense against intervention.5
1. G.A. Res. 3074, 3, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 3, 1973).
2. See generally S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
3. Id.
4. See generally A.P.V. Rogers, Symposium: The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Situations: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 HARv. J. L & PUB. POL'Y 725 (2004).
5. See generally Henry T. King, Jr., Address: Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CAsE W. RES. J.
INT'L. 135 (1996). See generally Mitchell A. Meyers, Note & Comment, A Defense of Unilateral or
Multilateral Intervention Where a Violation of International Human Rights Law By a State Constitutes an
Implied Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 895 (1997).
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Kofi Annan has stated: "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to
a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend
every precept of our common humanity?"'6 I share these collective opinions.
Let me be clear that I do not favor intervention willy-nilly. I also see some
very complex legal and political situations arising from my position, including
Chechnya, and possibly even Tibet. On the other hand, ICISS has done the
international law community great service by advocating military intervention
to protect against and prevent atrocities under carefully prescribed
circumstances, and only when the UN Security Council fails to act. These
circumstances include slayings of or threats to kill large numbers of people;
large scale ethnic cleansing; crimes against humanity or war crimes which
could have caused or did cause many deaths; the collapse of a state followed by
imminent danger of starvation or civil war; or huge natural and environmental
catastrophes if a state is unwilling or unable to help and many people are
endangered or killed.7 Worth noting here is the General Assembly's 2005
adoption, in Resolution 60/1, of the ICISS work as the basis for recognizing
"the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. '
Finally, I want to emphasize the need for effective, rather than ineffective,
intervention in carrying out the duty and responsibility to protect. Professor
Nanda has mentioned this morning the inability of a viable African
peacekeeping force to be formed and placed on the ground in Darfur, and
meanwhile the killings there continue. Bosnia and Rwanda witnessed great
tragedies caused by the ineffective presence of NATO and UN troops unwilling
or unable to protect civilian populations, when innocent victims relied on the
presence of these troops to congregate in groups around them only to find
themselves in harm's way. I stress here that once a decision is made to enter
a strife-ridden place to protect lives, it must be done right to avoid compound-
ing the atrocities. Time does not permit discussing here how effective
intervention can be done. I nonetheless note that international intervention
treaties by participating states, as contemplated in General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3074, offer potentially successful legal mechanisms in this regard.9
Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
6. The Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First
Century, ch. 4, at 48, U.N. Doc. No. A/54/2000 (Apr. 3,2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/
sg/report/fuIll.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
7. See THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMM'N ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Sept. 21, 2001).
8. G.A. Res. 60/1, 138, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
9. See G.A. Res. 3074, supra note 1.
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CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT: TWO MINDS THAT
MAY NEVER MEET
Charles H. Rose II*
"[C]onspiracy, that darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery."'
Good morning. I wish to thank my fellow panelists, the International Law
Society, and the New York City Bar Association for hosting this excellent
conference. It is important that we gather together to talk about the massive,
and sometimes unintended, impact that recent changes in our approach to war
and international law are currently having on the rule of law. I am honored to
be here today. I come to this discussion as an old trial lawyer, criminal lawyer,
and military lawyer. My comments arise from those disciplines, and my views
have been formed in the crucible of my own practical and theoretical
experiences, so I share them with you to give context to my comments.
We stand at a point in our history where customary international law, the
law of war,2 and criminal law-both domestic and international-are
combining in ways that have not been planned, reviewed, or consciously
implemented. The resulting chaos may have long-term implications and
threatens the rule of law as currently defined by most modem democracies. 3
Military personnel take an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, and to bear true faith
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law, Associate Director, Center for
Excellence in Advocacy, L.L.M., 2000; The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army; J.D.,
1993, Notre Dame Law School; Judge Advocate, 1993-2004, United States Army; Associate Professor of
Law, 2000-2003, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. I wish to thank Stetson
University for its generous support of the faculty and my research assistant, Marissa Gonzalez, for her
assistance. Finally, I wish to acknowledge every soldier who ever carried a rifle or stood a post--this is for
you. All mistakes contained within this speech are, of course, my own.
I. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1925) (ruling on defendants' appeal that the
lower court erred in convicting defendants of violating and conspiring to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act).
2. My understanding of the Law of War is based in large part on the classes taught at the Judge
Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, the ARMY FIELD MANUAL FOR THE
Low and the JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK.
3. For an excellent discussion on the development of the Rule of Law, both historically and
otherwise, see BRAIN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004).
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and allegiance to the same."4 I view my comments today as a continued
fulfillment of that oath as a retired officer and member the United States Army
Judge Advocate General's Corps.
I am particularly concerned with recent changes in criminal law that were
designed to assist in the war on terror, specifically, the modified definition of
conspiracy found in the Military Commissions Order and subsequent Military
Commissions Act. I am afraid this change will have a negative impact on the
long-term viability of the rule of law in criminal justice systems. This danger
is very real, and extends to both the domestic and international criminal justice
arena. Others have commented on the dangers to the our Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation and our Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the United
States, but I speak today of changing the definition and element for conspiracy
in the Military Commissions Act as to the intent and knowledge requirements
and the potentially disastrous effect these changes could have to our concept of
what constitutes an appropriate criminal justice system.
Conspiracy law has been designed to deter criminal activity by providing
a prosecutor with the means to hold members of an illicit organization that
engages solely in criminal activity accountable before the law. This is a
necessary tool in any competent prosecutor's kit bag, but it can be subject to
abuse. Accordingly, this area of the law has been subject to a great deal of
scrutiny and debate because it has the potential to make "status" as a member
of an organization an offense when the person who joined that organization did
so with the requisite knowledge that the organization was in fact illicit. While
this historical definition makes sense for domestic law, it is problematic when
applied to the confrontations between nation states that result in armed conflict.
One person's illicit organization is another group's religious faith, freedom
fighter's association, or ethnic conclave. This difficulty extends to include
armed conflict with non-nation state actors-a large part of the current global
war on terror. Many of these organizations may have both illicit and licit
purposes in light of their own societal mores, local law, and customs. Dealing
with these concerns in the past caused the United States Government, the
United States Military, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia to define conspiracy as a specific intent crime, either practically or
statutorily. The only known exception dealt with crimes against humanity, a
term of art that grew out of the Nuremberg tribunals. This ensures that the
knowledge element is present before individuals can be indicted for conspiracy.
If we are going to hold someone criminally liable for the acts committed by an
organization to which they belong, they must have had the specific intent to j oin
that organization and the knowledge of what that organization did.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2007).
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The original Military Commissions Order, and subsequent Military
Commissions Act, charges conspiracy with a general intent mens rea. While
the Military Order claims to merely restate already existing law, an examination
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the law as
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) reveals that in no other body of law from which the
Order could have drawn the elements of conspiracy is there any discussion of
conspiracy as a general intent crime. Each of these systems of criminal justice
defines conspiracy as a specific intent crime. The Military Order created a new
crime on November 16, 2001, when it defined conspiracy as a general intent
crime.
We should consider existing United States law, the UCMJ, and the case
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia when
contemplating how conspiracy has been defined and applied in situations
analogous to the Global War on Terror. In each of these systems, the law
defines conspiracy as a specific intent crime either directly or through
application. This has enormous importance when considering the new "general
intent" conspiracy statute present in the original Military Commission Order 2
and the subsequent Military Commissions Act passed by the United States
Congress and signed by President George W. Bush. The Military Commissions
Order defining conspiracy as a general intent crime, which claimed to "restate"
already existing law, was passed on November 16, 2001. The Military Order
created a new state of mind necessary to commit conspiracy, thereby redefining
the statutory elements for conspiracy as applied to military commissions. Let
us consider that order, which formed the basis for the subsequent Military
Commissions Act, and then review conspiracy law as applied by the United
States, the Military, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia so that we can understand the deleterious effect of this "redefining"
of conspiracy by the Military Commissions Order and subsequent Military
Commissions Act.
The Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction Number
Two, passed on November 16, 2001 states, "[a]ll actions taken by the Accused
that are necessary for completion of a crime must be performed with general
intent."5 Additionally, the Military Order specifies that conspiracy meet the
following requirements:
1) The accused entered into an agreement with one or more
persons to commit one or more substantive offenses triable by
military commission or otherwise joined an enterprise of
persons who shared a common criminal purpose that involved,
5. 32 C.F.R. § 11.4 (2003).
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at least in part, the commission or intended commission of one
or more substantive offenses triable by military commission;
2) The accused knew the unlawful purpose of the... enterprise
and joined it willfully, that is, with the intent to further the
unlawful purpose; and
3) One of the conspirators or enterprise members, during the
existence of the agreement or enterprise, knowingly committed
an overt act in order to accomplish some objective or purpose
of the agreement or enterprise.'
The mens rea necessary to accomplish the other three elements of conspiracy,
as set forth by the Military Commission, is general intent.
While the UCMJ is silent as to the requisite mens rea for conspiracy in the
article, when we review the language and application of both conspiracy and
attempt under the UCMJ, it is clear that specific intent is necessary to commit
conspiracy. The UCMJ states that attempted conspiracy is not an "offense" as
used in definition of attempt as an act done with specific intent to commit the
offense, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending to effect its
commission.' When the person solicited agrees to participate in a concerted
action with the person soliciting to commit a crime, then a conspiracy is
formed. An attempt itself occurs on the very threshold of completion of the
substantive crime. An attempt requires an overt act done with the specific
intent to commit the offense.8
Closely read, this section says that there is no such crime as attempted
conspiracy, but that there is only conspiracy. When specific intent is required
for attempted conspiracy, that state of mind is also required for conspiracy. In
United States v. Shelton, the court states that it is legally possible for a
perpetrator to lack the premeditated design to kill and nonetheless have the
specific intent to enter into a conspiracy to commit unpremeditated murder in
violation of Article 118(2).9 10 U.S.C. § 880(a) notes that "[a]n act, done with
specific intent to commit an offense . . . amounting to more than mere
preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an
attempt to commit that offense."'" Since the UCMJ is silent as to what mens
rea is specifically required for conspiracy, a synthesizing of both the laws for
attempt and the laws for conspiracy, sections 880 and 881 of title 10, support
the position that conspiracy is a specific intent crime under the Uniform Code
6. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2003).
7. 10 U.S.C. § 880(80)(a); see also MCM, 1984, Part IV, para. 4(a)(a).
8. Id. at para. 4(c)(1).
9. United States v. Shelton, 62 M.J. 1, 11 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
10. 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2006).
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of military justice. In United States v. Owen, the elements of attempted
conspiracy to commit murder in connection with planned contract murder were
found to be that the "accused solicited another to agree to procure the services
of a contract killer; this was done with the specific intent to commit the murder
of the intended victim; this amounted to more than mere preparation; and the
act apparently tended to effect an agreement to commit the crime of murder.""
The United States Supreme Court defines conspiracy as a specific intent
crime. "It is established that since the gravamen of the offense . . . is
conspiracy, the prosecution must show that the offender acted with a specific
intent to interfere with the federal rights in question."' 2 Specific intent requires
a more thorough inquiry into both the crime committed and into the state of
mind of the alleged offender because for one to have specific intent, the alleged
offender must intend to commit the primary offense with either or both
knowledge or purpose that more consequences will result from that primary
offense. General intent, by its very nature, has a much lower threshold of proof.
Since conspiracy is a specific intent crime, requiring the intent to agree or
conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the
conspiracy. The specific intent to join with another person in the
accomplishment of an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means
must exist.'
3
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
states that conspiracy is a specific intent crime: "proof is required that whoever
planned, instigated or ordered the commission of a crime possessed the criminal
intent, that is, he directly or indirectly intended that the crime in question be
committed."' 4 The ICTY goes on to hold that: "an accused will only be held
responsible for planning, instigating or ordering a crime if he directly or
indirectly intended that the crime be committed."' 5 The ICTY holds conspiracy
to a higher standard of intent on the part of the perpetrator. Under the ICTY,
a person charged with conspiracy must have had the requisite specific intent to
commit the crime and any secondary effects that flow from that commission. 6
The ICTY found this definition of conspiracy necessary to effectively sort
through the dirty business associated with a civil war and genocide. It is
11. United States v. Owen, 47 M.J. 501, 501 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1997); see 10 U.S.C. § 880(80),
(934)(134).
12. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211,223 (1974); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 753-54 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
13. United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945, 950 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d
138, 146 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999).
14. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 278 (Mar. 3, 2000).
15. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 386 (Feb. 26, 2001).
16. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 262 (Nov. 2, 2001).
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interesting to note that the ICTY did not adopt a general intent definition for
conspiracy even though they were faced with issues of genocide similar to that
facing the Nuremberg tribunals after World War II.
The ICTY defines crimes against humanity in a way that requires specific
intent for these types of crimes. "The requisite mens rea for crimes against
humanity appears to be comprised by 1) the intent to commit the underlying
offence, combined with 2) knowledge of the broader context in which that
offence occurs."' 7 The preexisting international laws of the ICTY concerning
conspiracy appear to track with preexisting federal law and preexisting military
law. Historically, conspiracy is a specific intent crime.
If conspiracy is considered as a crime against humanity, under current
international law, not only would the alleged perpetrator have to possess
specific intent, but he or she would also have to possess discriminatory intent.
"The aider and abettor of persecution, as a 'special intent' crime, must not only
have knowledge of the crime he is assisting or facilitating. He must also be
aware that the crimes being assisted or supported are committed with a
discriminatory intent."' 8 Addressing this from a purely practical standpoint, the
level of intent necessary to commit these crimes does not gradually move
toward the lower threshold of proof. Rather, the standard hovers between
specific intent and a commingling of such with discriminatory intent. The
Military Commissions Order and subsequent Military Commissions Act do not
restate preexisting law concerning conspiracy, regardless of whether the alleged
source of that preexisting law is the United States Constitution, the UCMJ, or
customary international law.
When the Military Commissions Order and subsequent Military
Commissions Act changed the definition of conspiracy, they created an expost
facto issue when attempting to apply this new conspiracy law to misconduct
that occurred before the law as enacted. The ex post facto effect for war crimes
is not a new question of law for the United States and has previously been
answered. After the Military Tribunals-which followed World War II-the
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps published a report in 1953.19 That
report constitutes the historical knowledge of the Corps after having dealt with
these issues. According to the 1953 United States Army Judge Advocate
General Military Commissions Report, "[m]any occupation-security regulations
merely re-state, still in very generalized form, duties which are placed upon an
occupied population by international law, so that some of the same offenses
previously mentioned as war crimes may then appear with designations more
17. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, 556 (Jan. 14, 2000) (citing
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 225 (May 7, 1997)).
18. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 262 (Nov. 2, 2001).
19. 1953 JAGC Commissions Report at 26 (on file with author).
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specifically adapted to the occupational situation., 20 The Commissions Report
goes on to note that "[p]rosecution of crimes against humanity, at least on a
mass scale, is not subject to the ex post facto doctrine familiar to national
law. ' 21 The problem of whether ex post facto applies to international war
crimes is addressed further: "[w]hile it has been stated that ex post facto
doctrine is not applicable under international law, actual decisions usually have
avoided that position., 22 The Commissions Report states that in order for a
military court to deny the application of ex post facto doctrine, the crime in
question must have been committed on a mass scale. It may be assumed that
"mass scale" refers to a conflict similar to the attempted eradication of Jewish
persons by the Nazis.
There is a real danger in redefining conspiracy law to allow for general
intent. It allows a state to prosecute an individual for membership in an
organization, even when they did not know, or have reason to know, that the
organization was involved in criminal activity. It destroys the line between
illicit and licit behavior relied upon by when interpreting mens rea for
conspiracy. Through this redefined conspiracy definition, individuals become
criminally liable for acts they did not support and did not have knowledge of.
It may fairly be said that this definition makes membership in a group a crime.
While that may not be the intended effect, it is clearly the result of the new
definition.
We should stop and think carefully before we decide as a matter of law
that we cannot belong to an organization without becoming criminally liable for
whatever that organization does. This idea flies directly in the face of certain
cherished western notions of autonomy, individual expression, and our own
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association. I am not arguing for a
protective blanket under which a terrorist may hide while committing nefarious
deeds. But we must proceed carefully when redefining the laws upon which we
rely for our own freedoms. The quote of Sir Thomas Moore in the play, "A
Man for All Seasons," is applicable today.24 If we cut down all the laws of the
land to get at the devil of terrorism, what will we do when the law turns on us?
I fear that we shall suffer for it-and that would be a victory for terrorism on
a level that none of us should ever accept.
20. Id.
21. Id., citing KEENAN AND BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 54, 118 (1950).
22. Id. at 48.
23. Id.
24. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1963). "And when the last law was down, and
the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?"
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The theme of our presentation is "Military Jurisprudence: Bastion of
Conservatism or Progressive Problem Solver." I believe that all of us on this
panel can agree that in many respects the military and military jurisprudence
reflects an innovative pragmatism. This innovative approach is necessary and
important if we are to adapt to the evolving nature of warfare. In order to stay
relevant and to serve our clients, military lawyers and military law has often
been a progressive problem solver.
Yet, the reality is that, in some ways, it definitely is a mixed bag as to
whether military jurisprudence is a progressive problem solver or a bastion of
conservatism. This mixed bag is often reflected in the way the military has
applied the law of war in the international context verses the way the military
has developed and applied the law of war domestically.
One interesting aspect of the recently passed Military Commissions Act
(MCA)' is the portion of Subchapter VII of the act which sets forth the
substantive offenses to be tried by military commissions. According to section
950p, the purpose of this subsection is to "codify offenses that have tradition-
ally been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new
crimes that did not exist.., but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission."2
Following this explanation, the MCA then first codifies certain criminal
law doctrines that are not enumerated offenses but rather reflect broader
* Professor Victor M. Hansen teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and
Professional Responsibility. Before joining the New England School of Law faculty in 2005, he last served
as a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army JAG Corps. He previously served as a regional defense
counsel for the United States Army Trial Defense Service. He has worked as a military prosecutor and
supervising prosecutor, and he has been involved in military capital litigation as a prosecutor and as a defense
attorney. He also served as an associate professor of law at The Judge Advocate General's School in
Charlottesville, Virginia. He is the author of "Lessons From Abu Ghraib: Time for the U.S. to Adopt a
Standard of Command Responsibility Towards its Own" to be published in the Gonzaga Law Review, Vol.
42:3. He is a Co-Author of the forthcoming Military Crimes and Defenses (Lexis Publication), and he is the
author of numerous manuals and articles on criminal and military law, evidence, and trial advocacy.
I. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter MCA].
2. Id. at § 950p(a).
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criminal law concepts that developed in the common law. These broader
concepts include liability of a principal, liability of an accessory, and the
inchoate concepts of attempt and solicitation.3
The MCA next sets out the elements of some twenty-eight offenses that
can be tried by military commissions. These offenses include murder of
protected persons,4 murder in violation of the law of war,5 attacking civilians,6
attacking protected property,7 pillaging,' denying quarter,9 taking hostages,'l
rape," sexual assault, 2 and other offenses. I view the codification of these
crimes that are triable by military commission as a positive development. This
codification provides clearer standards and greater clarity which should allow
both the prosecution and the defense the ability to try cases in military
commissions in a more efficient and fair manner. This is an example of a
pragmatic solution to the problem that under the law of war and under
international law it is often unclear what the criminal standards are and what
criminal elements exist for offenses under the law of war.
One of the most interesting aspects of this codification effort is the MCA's
definition of "principals." Along with the traditional definition that most of us
are familiar with, section 950q states:
Any person is punishable as a principal... who-(3) is a superior
commander who, with regard to acts punishable under this chapter,
knew, or had reason to know, or should have known, that a
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 3
Anyone familiar with the Yamashita tribunal, the Nuremberg war Crimes
Tribunals, or the Tokyo Trials will certainly recognize that this provision is an
attempt to codify the doctrine of command responsibility into the law of
principals. By command responsibility, I am referring to that notion of imputed
3. See, e.g., id at § 950q, r, t, u.
4. Id. at § 950v(b)(1).
5. Id. at § 950v(b)(15).
6. MCA, supra note 1, at § 950v(b)(2).
7. Id. at § 950v(b)(4).
8. Id. at § 950v(b)(5).
9. Id. at § 950v(b)(6).
10. Id. at § 950v(b)(7).
11. MCA, supra note 1, at § 950v(b)(2 1).
12. Id. at § 950v(b)(22).
13. Id. at § 950q(3).
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derivative liability, where the superior has a duty to control his forces and
prevent them from committing law of war violations. 4 If the superior fails to
perform this duty in preventing, stopping or punishing law of war violations,
the crimes committed by his subordinates can be imputed to the commander.
This doctrine has existed under international law certainly since the end
of WWII, and has been codified in more recent international treaties and
statutes including Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,15 Article 7 of
the statute on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), 6 Article 6 of the statute on the International Criminal Tribunal For
Rwanda (ICTR),17 and Article 28 of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court.18
An interesting point to note about the codification of the doctrine under the
MCA is the MCA's treatment of the mens rea of command responsibility. The
MCA seems to adopt a hodgepodge of mens rea components including actual
knowledge, "had reason to know," as well as a "should have known" standard.
Clearly this approach is an attempt to extend liability as broadly as possible,
short of vicarious or strict liability on the part of the superior commander.
Another interesting point with the MCA's codification of this doctrine is
that a superior can be liable as a principal even if his failure was nothing more
than a failure to punish past violations committed by forces currently under his
command. A situation could arise where a person who was not the superior at
the time the offenses were committed can still be liable as if he committed the
offenses. Assume a superior takes command of the forces after the war crimes
were committed, but before they were discovered. The new commander then
ether discovers or fails to discover the crimes, and does not take action to
punish his subordinates. That commander can now be punished as if he
14. I have provided a more complete analysis of the doctrine of command responsibility, its
development in international law, and the need for the United States to incorporate this doctrine into domestic
law in an article to be published in the forthcoming Volume 42:3 of the Gonzaga Law Review.
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted
in Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andRelating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978).
16. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY] reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993). On
the ICTY, see generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
17. The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. SIRES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994).
18. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoteniaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/COND.
183/9 (July 17,1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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committed the offenses, even though he was not in command at the time the
offenses were committed. I would posit that this is quite a broad application of
the command responsibility doctrine.
This codification of command responsibility in the MCA is a clear
example of how military jurisprudence is both a progressive problem solver
and, in some instances, a bastion of conservatism. When one looks at U.S.
domestic law reflected in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), there
is no comparable codification of the command responsibility doctrine. While
we are willing to hold superior commanders of other forces criminally liable for
the law of war violations committed by their forces, we are unable, or at least
unwilling, to hold our own commanders to a similar standard.
Some have argued that Article 18 of the UCMJ 19 already incorporates the
doctrine of command responsibility into the UCMJ because Article 18 grants
general courts-martial jurisdiction over any person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by military tribunal. However, this argument fails for several
reasons. Most significantly, the command responsibility doctrine under the law
of war is not sufficiently clear and any attempt to prosecute an American
solider under the vague law of war standard is likely to run afoul of
fundamental constitutional protections. In addition, it has long been the policy
of the United States not to try our own forces for violations of the law of war,
but rather to try them for violations of the punitive articles under the UCMJ.20
So, this is an example where military jurisprudence has been both a
progressive problem solver and a bastion of conservativism. The MCA's
codification of offenses triable under military commissions is a positive
development. However, this codification should give us some pause to question
whether the standards we are codifying, and that we are holding our enemies to,
are the same standards of accountability we hold our own forces to. In the case
of command responsibility, a double standard exists. I believe that this double
standard must be eliminated. While I do not have time to discuss the most
effective way to incorporate the doctrine of command responsibility under
domestic law in this forum, there are some points to consider.
Command responsibility should not be an expansion of the law of
principles as has been done under the MCA. Were the U.S. to take this
approach, commanders could potentially be liable for any offense committed
by the forces under their command in peace or in war, and liability would not
be limited only to law of war violations or similar offenses. I believe that a
much more comprehensive amending of the UCMJ is necessary. The
19. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE § 818, art. 18, reprinted in MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES at A2-6 (2005).
20. See Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE APPENDIX A-120, para. 507(b) (1956).
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amendment should clearly set out a commander's special legal relationship and
legal duty regarding his obligations to prevent his forces from committing
violations of the law of war and similar offenses. I also believe that the mens
rea of command responsibility should be more clearly and precisely defined
than any of the formulations that currently exist under international law and
under the MCA. Additionally, I believe that various degrees of punishment
should be imposed based on the commander's degree of liability. Only if we
are willing to apply the standards we use against other forces to our own forces,
will military jurisprudence truly be a progressive innovator and problem solver.
THE LAW OF WAR AFTER THE DTA, HAMDAN
AND THE MCA
LTC Eric Talbot Jensen*
I am grateful to be here and part of this panel and to discuss these
important issues.
Part of my goal as a member of this panel is to portray DoD's assessment
of some of the recent issues that have made up many of the topics for this
Conference. When military experts are asked to provide advice or an opinion
on a larger issue, we focus on the military interests. The same has been true of
these issues, including the Detainee Treatment Act,' the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,2 and the Military Commissions Act.3
In all of these cases, the military's interests have revolved around issues
germane to the law of war and military application of those laws. For example,
I know that a great discussion has begun around the habeus corpus stripping
provisions of the MCA. That is an aspect of the MCA that has very little
impact on the military. I don't have much to say about that issue. However, I
think there are three particular issues that have a significant impact on the
military and about which I would like to talk about. They are: first, Hamdan's
discounting of a "no law" zone by holding that Common Article 3 (CA3) of the
Geneva Conventions applies to all conflicts that are not between states; second,
the amendment to the War Crimes Act (WCA) which details "serious crimes"
under CA3; and third, the establishment of the minimum standards for
treatment of detainees on the battlefield by the DTA and Hamdan.
* Chief, International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. B.A.,
Brigham Young University (1989); J.D., University of Notre Dame (1994); LL.M., The Judge Advocate
General's Legal Center and School (2001); LL.M., Yale University (2006). The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and not The Judge Advocate General's Corps, the United States Army, or the
Department of Defense. I would like to thank Mr. Richard Jackson, Chief, Law of War Branch, Office of the
Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, for his comments and assistance.
I. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742-44.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. (2006).
3. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in
scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter MCA].
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As I am sure you all know, the Geneva Conventions4 establish a three tier
paradigm for conflict classification. Common Article 2 describes armed
conflicts between states and applies the full body of the law of war to those
conflicts. Because there are a number of conflicts that are not between states,
either civil wars or other conflicts, the Geneva Conventions also contain
Common Article 3 which says that in armed conflicts "not of an international
character" "persons taking no active part in hostilities" get some protections
that do not equal those given to prisoners of war, but still represent a baseline
of humane treatment. Then, the Conventions, and particularly the
Commentary, 5 contemplate conflicts that do not rise to the level of armed
conflict but are typified as banditry or marauders. These are matters for
domestic law, which is governed by domestic legal standards and applicable
Human Rights Law. Because Human Rights Laws, like the ICCPR,6 are
designed to apply to the relationship between a state and the people of the state,
U.S. policy does not generally apply Human Rights Law extraterritorially;
instead, in military operations, the military applies the lex specialis of the Law
of Armed Conflict.
This seemingly trifurcated, or really bifurcated for the purposes of the
military, paradigm left some issues unresolved. In the years subsequent to the
Geneva Conventions, there has been debate concerning the coverage of CA2
and CA3. As early as 1951, Richard Baxter argued that unprivileged
belligerents received no protections under the Conventions but were "virtually
at the power of the enemy."7 After the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001, the
Bush Administration took a similar approach and consistently asserted that
neither CA2 nor CA3 applied to detainees in the Global War on Terror
(GWOT).8
4. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Article 3 opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter GWS]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GSW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter GCC].
5. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t=com (last visited, Mar. 17, 2007).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force for the United States Sept. 8, 1992).
7. Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1951).
8. See generally David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005).
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With the decision in Hamdan, it is now clear that CA3's coverage is broad
enough to cover unlawful combatants in the GWOT. The Supreme Court held:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that
Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict
with al Qaeda, being "'international in scope,"' does not qualify as a
'conflict not of an international character."' 415 F.3d at 41. That
reasoning is erroneous. The term "conflict not of an international
character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations. So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the
Convention's provisions on its application." Id., at 44 (Williams, J.,
concurring). Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties." 6 U.S.T., at 3318 (Art. 2, 1). High Contracting Parties
(signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-A-
vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory
"Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter
accepts and applies" those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, 3). Common Article
3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full
protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with
neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who are involved
in a conflict "in the territory of' a signatory. The latter kind of
conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common
Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations
(whether signatories or not). In context, then, the phrase "not of an
international character" bears its literal meaning. See, e.g., J.
Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6,
296 (J. Bums & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term "international
law" as a "new though not inexpressive appellation" meaning
"betwixt nation and nation"; defining "international" to include
"mutual transactions between sovereigns as such"); Commentary on
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, p. 1351 (1987) ("[A] non-international armed conflict is
distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal
status of the entities opposing each other").9
As a result of this holding, every armed conflict that US armed forces are
involved in invokes the protections of CA3. The standard appears to be the
existence of hostilities and the use of the regular armed forces. There is not a
"no law" zone where people can be excluded from receiving humane treatment
because the type of armed conflict doesn't seem to fit neatly into one of the two
9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
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traditional categories. Rather the reach of international law covers all persons
on the battlefield during an armed conflict. Even in this strange but deadly war
against terrorism, that isn't against another state but crosses multiple
international boundaries, there is international law that guarantees all persons
will be treated humanely.
Though, as I will argue below, this didn't change the practical application
of treatment of military detainees, it provides a clear statement of why the
military's practice has been what it has been for the past several decades. It is
a pronouncement that the law of war has application to everyone in an armed
conflict, not just to those who fit the traditional paradigm.
The next issue that I think has had some significant impact on the military
is the amendment of the War Crimes Act. In passing the MCA, Congress
amended the WCA. In 1996, the WCA did not criminalize any violation of
Common Article 3. It was amended in 1997 to include all violations of CA3 as
a war crime.' ° This blanket coverage was, at least in part, in response to a
request by DoD." This coverage was too broad for fair and meaningful
application because not all violations of CA3 are criminal in nature. Some of
the more serious crimes, such as murder, mutilation, and torture are clearly
criminal and should be treated as war crimes. Other violations, such as some
10. Prior to the enactment of the MCA, 18 U.S.C. 2441 (2006) read:
a) Offense.-Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war
crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the
victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.
(b) Circumstances.-The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the
person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in
section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
(c) Defmition.-As used in this section the term "war crime" means any conduct-
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection
(d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not
of an international character; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol H as amended on 3
May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes
serious injury to civilians.
11. Letter from Judith Miller to Honorable Bill McCollum, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, H.R. 698, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996).
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forms of cruel treatment or humiliating and degrading treatment, may not
deserve to be considered a war crime but should be prohibited and sanctioned
in other ways.
12
This rationale is similar to that established to deal with grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions. Articles 129" of the GPW and 146'4 of the GCC
establish a bifurcated system for responding to violations of the law of war. In
the case of grave breaches, signatories accepted the obligation to pass laws that
criminalized violations, search for alleged offenders, and prosecute alleged
offenders or turn them over to another country that will prosecute them. "5 For
12. See John B. Bellinger mI, State Dept. Legal Advisor, State Dept. Briefing (Oct. 19, 2006),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/74786.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
13. GPW, supra note 4 at art. 129 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of
the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches
defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and
those following of the present Convention.
14. GCC, supra note 4 at art. 146 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of
the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches
defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and
those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949.
15. GWS, supra note 4 at art. 50; GPW, supra note 4 at art. 130; GCC, supra note 4 at art. 147.
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non-grave breaches, the obligation is to "take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention."' 6
The MCA establishes a similar system which criminalizes as war crimes
the serious crimes from CA3, and allows other violations of CA3 to be
remedied through suppression, appropriate lesser criminal or administrative
sanctions, and retraining. I think this is an appropriate result. Serious crimes
need to be criminalized, but the military has a number of methods including
lesser criminal sanctions, nonjudicial punishment, administrative punishment
or separation, that are more appropriate methods for some less serious
violations.
Finally, as briefly mentioned above, the recent passage of the DTA and
decision in Hamdan have also focused the international law lens on CA3 and
the standards of treatment for detainees. The DTA prohibits cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment as defined by the 5th, 8th, and 14th
Amendments' jurisprudence on cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or
punishment. 7 This prohibition is sweeping in that it covers anyone "under the
physical control of the United States Government.' 18 In Hamdan, the Supreme
Court provided additional affirmation of the humane treatment standard by
applying CA3 to all non-international armed conflicts, including the GWOT.
In conjunction with the DTA's and Hamdan's establishment of a minimum
standard of treatment for battlefield detainees, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gordon England instructed all military units to verify that "all DoD personnel
adhere to [Common Article 3].''19 The DEPSECDEF memo was an important
affirmation of the minimum standards for conduct, under the Law of War.
However, this was unnecessary as the military has been applying an even higher
standard, that of giving every detainee prisoner of war treatment until otherwise
instructed, as a matter of policy2" for at least two decades. It has been and
continues to be the policy of the United States military to treat all detainees
humanely and as Prisoners of War, until otherwise directed by competent
16. GCC, supra note 4, at art. 146.
17. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 at 2742-44.
18. Id.
19. Memorandum from Gordon England, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the Application of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense
(Jul. 7, 2006), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM (Dec. 9, 1998), available at http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf/d5l0077_120998/
d510077p.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) which states:
5.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
5.3.1. Ensure that the members of their DoD Components comply with the law of war
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.
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authority. This treatment does not establish status, but does provide a standard
of treatment that exceeds that required by either the DTA or Hamdan.
This GPW-based standard of treatment has recently been confirmed in the
promulgation of DoD Directive 2310.1 E, "DoD Detainee Program,",2' and FM
2-22.3, "Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 2 2 The Directive and FM
require all detainees, including unlawful combatants, be treated consistent with
the requirements of CA3 as a minimum standard. They also reiterate the GPW
standards for prisoners of war. The Directive further enumerates specifically
prohibited acts such as murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the
taking of hostages, collective punishments, execution without trial by proper
authority, and all cruel and degrading treatment, in accordance with and as
defined in U.S. law; threats or acts of violence, including rape, forced
prostitution, assault and theft, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals;
being subjected to medical or scientific experiments; and protects against being
subjected to sensory deprivation.
I believe that the events of the past five years have highlighted and
illustrated the wisdom and practical efficiency in DoD's approach to treatment
of detainees, and I think that has been borne out by the subsequent actions of
the President, Congress and courts.
In conclusion, I think these three recent events:
1) Hamdan's discounting of a "no law" zone by holding that CA3
of the Geneva Conventions applies to all conflicts that are not
between states;
2) The amendment to the WCA to detail "serious crimes" under
CA3; and
3) The establishment of humane treatment as the minimum
standards for treatment of detainees on the battlefield by the
DTA and Hamdan
demonstrate the continuing vitality of the law of war and its effects on
international law.
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2310.01E, DEP'T OF DEFENSE
DETAINEE PROGRAM (Sep. 5, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/DetaineePrgm_
Dir_2310_9-5-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (Sep. 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ftn2-22-3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The blurb in your program brochure asks, "Should the U.S. adopt a new
procedure for implementing adverse World Trade Organization (WTO)
decisions, possibly including an active role for U.S. courts?" In other words,
should WTO dispute settlement decisions be given some sort of official status
in the U.S. legal system? The topic is a timely one. There is a debate now
going on and likely to intensify soon about Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA)-a political arrangement designed to facilitate cooperation between the
two political branches of the Federal Government with authority in the field of
international economic relations. But in order to lead anywhere really
productive, the debate should step back a few paces and look more broadly at
our front-loaded system for achieving conformity with international obligations
undertaken in the trade field.
What do I mean by a front-loaded approach? The basic idea is that we
seek to make the changes necessary to implement new trade obligations all at
once, through an implementing bill enacted after a pact's signature and before
its entry into force. Thereafter, we worry mainly about complying with U.S.
* Mr. Magnus is President of TRADEWINS LLC and has been an active trade practitioner for
seventeen years, serving as external counsel to domestic and foreign firms and industry coalitions in sectors
such as steel, forest products, chemicals, microelectronics, aerospace, textiles/apparel, photographic materials,
insurance, beverage alcohol, machine tools, telecommunications, motion pictures and cable television. He
advises and represents clients on multilateral negotiations and WTO disputes; on regional and bilateral trade
initiatives; on U.S. trade legislation and Congressional oversight activities; on high-profile market access
cases involving goods and services; on foreign governments' trade regimes and industrial policy measures;
and on customs and compliance issues. Since 2003, Mr. Magnus has been an Adjunct Professor of Law at
the University of Baltimore School of Law, teaching International Business Transactions and International
Trade Law and Policy. Mr. Magnus is admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, and the U.S. Court of International Trade, as well as
in the District of Columbia, and the State of California. He holds a JD from the University of Chicago Law
School (1990) and an AB, International Relations from Stanford University (1986).
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law as revised, rather than focusing directly on international obligations. This
is implicit in our TPA system-a system that aims to resolve a constitutional
conundrum-to enable us to participate as a credible partner in trade initiatives,
and to assign an appropriate implementing role to all three branches of
government. In the case of the judicial branch, the assigned role is basically
zero. We maintain a membrane between our legal system and the international
obligations, and we sideline judges by denying them any real role in policing
the government's conformity with international rules. They have to apply
domestic law in the cases that come before them, even if they think that
domestic law implements (transposes) international obligations incorrectly.
This situation strikes many lawyers, especially those from other jurisdic-
tions, as unsettling. And objectively speaking, the premise that we can do all
of our implementing up-front is starting to look more and more like a conceit.
According to one recent count published by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, there have been thirty three WTO dispute settlement cases
against the United States that succeeded on core issues, with U.S. measures
found to violate WTO obligations.1 The U.S. implementing legislation for the
WTO agreements, known as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), was
enacted in 1994 and took full effect along with the WTO agreements
themselves on January 1, 1995. Even subtracting cases involving measures put
in place after January 1, 1995, a few of which have been challenged at the
WTO, thirty-three losses means there were a lot of errors in the URAA-
mainly, a lot of measures we didn't think we needed to amend or repeal in
1994, but were later told we did. Such adverse rulings are hard to swallow,
since they reflect a stark difference of opinion (between the U.S. implementers
and the WTO adjudicators) over what the United States really agreed to. When
told that our implementers made dozens of serious errors, some of us suspect
that the problem may often lie with the adjudicators. The front-loaded
approach is also poorly-suited to ensuring conformity over time with certain
kinds of obligations, such as the obligation not to harm trading partners through
subsidization.
II. RESPONDING TO ADVERSE WTO DECISIONS-THE CURRENT SITUATION
Concerning the U.S. response when presented with adverse WTO dispute
settlement decisions, the situation at present is basically as follows:
1. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE U.S.
(2006), available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/
WTO/SectionIndex.html (follow "Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the United States" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 17, 2007).
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1) The Executive Branch, speaking for the United States, always
promptly declares an intention to bring measures found WTO
inconsistent into conformity, and normally requests a "reason-
able period of time" in which to do so. The Executive Branch
does not always have a clear sense of how the measures will be
revised to achieve conformity, or a clear plan for securing
Congressional approval where this is needed, but it always
announces an intention to comply. There were rumors that the
Internet Gambling case would break this pattern, and indeed it
might have if the Appellate Body had not modified the lower
panel findings and produced a final decision that could be
regarded as tolerable from a U.S. point of view.
2) Where the changes needed are within the power of the
Executive Branch to deliver, they are always delivered and
almost always on-time.
3) Where the changes needed require an Act of Congress, there are
sometimes substantial delays, and a few adverse decisions
requiring congressional action remain un-implemented to this
day (Examples: Havana Club, antidumping "all others" rate).
Congressional action can be obtained, even when political
resistance is strong, where meaningful retaliation by powerful
trading partners provides an added incentive (Examples:
FSC/ETI, Byrd Amendment). But generally, the Administration
is more interested in achieving WTO conformity than the
Congress is, and is asked to pay some sort of political price to
"buy" congressional action. Legislation implementing adverse
WTO decisions therefore is sometimes packaged with other
provisions, desired by Congress, which the administration
would not likely support in isolation. In one case (Irish Music),
the United States "monetized" a WTO conformity problem,
paying cash as a settlement to stem pressure from a victorious
complainant rather than altering a U.S. statute that would have
been politically hard to change. In another case that was
originally thought to require congressional action (Internet
Gambling), the Administration cited changes in its internal
"enforcement posture", which it said were adequate to achieve
conformity with the adopted WTO decision. The complainant
(Antigua) disagreed and requested compliance proceedings,
which resulted in a finding that the United States has not yet
achieved WTO-conformity in this matter.
In sum, we have a fairly ponderous mechanism for acting in the wake of
an adverse WTO decision, and a pretty skeptical attitude toward the whole
endeavor. We certainly could, in theory, streamline things.
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I1. WHAT ABOUT A CHANGE?
So what are the best reasons for and against a change that would "pierce
the membrane," give WTO obligations a higher status in the U.S. legal system,
and (presumably) allow judges to get into the game of policing the govern-
ment's behavior? Reasons for such a change include the following:
1) The nature of WTO obligations is changing, and in a way that
will put ever more pressure on our front-loaded implementing
system. Increasingly, the WTO rules include not just negative
obligations ("I will refrain from doing X to interfere with trade
if you will refrain from doing Y to interfere with trade") but
positive obligations as well ("I will do X to facilitate trade if
you will do Y to facilitate trade"). And they are becoming more
results-oriented rather than process-oriented ("I will undertake
to provide a competitive internal market for basic tele-
communications services"). What is needed to implement, and
ensure conformity over time, with obligations of this type
cannot easily be determined during the brief window between
signature and entry into force.
2) Judges, based on the trend of their opinions citing the
"Charming Betsy" doctrine, seem eager to get into this game,
and many of them would be capable of interpreting the WTO
agreements and judging government actions against those
agreements' requirements in close cases.
3) America's popularity in the world is at a low ebb in part because
of the perception that we are not much interested in being bound
by international rules. There is very little scope at present for
changing this perception in matters military (UN authorization
to use force; International Criminal Court), environmental
(Kyoto), or labor-related (ILO Conventions). Perhaps in the
economic sphere, where we are doing well and have a basis for
acting confidently, we could make a greater allowance and
effect a change that would have not just practical but also broad
symbolic importance.
Reasons against making such a major change include:
1) In debates over trade, we have always had a certain amount of
trouble with the "black helicopter" crowd-those who argue
that trade pacts, especially when coupled with membership in an
institution like the WTO, undermine our sovereignty. Up to
now, the WTO's defenders have always been able to prevail in
that argument, by pointing out that the WTO cannot directly
change U.S. legal and policy outcomes. We can be found in
[Vol. 13:2
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breach of WTO rules, but the decision about what to do in that
scenario is a political one. Without that layer of political
review, those dissenting on sovereignty grounds would have a
much more legitimate (and strongly felt) objection. Indeed, for
all its "voluntary" aspects, WTO dispute settlement is already
considered one of the most binding and effective forms of
international dispute settlement.
2) The WTO rules have edged (some would say sprawled) into a
number of areas that are sensitive, and in which a further
transfer of sovereignty would be troublesome. Included-to
cite just four that have caused problems for the United States
already-are such matters as gambling regulation, product
standards, government spending programs, and tax policy, as
well as various areas of service sector regulation traditionally
dominated by state and local authorities in the United States
rather than the federal government. Digesting this broader set
of obligations, not to mention finding consensus for still greater
expansions of the WTO's remit (now under discussion), will be
easier if we maintain political control in the dispute settlement
context.
3) The WTO dispute settlement process has produced a substantial
number of dubious pro-complainant decisions. Complainants
almost always succeed at least on large portions of their cases,
and there is a structural concern in that the decision-makers (and
the Secretariat officials who staff them) as individuals are
deeply invested in the WTO and want it to have the widest
footprint possible; they are generally willing to strain to find a
WTO rule that applies to conduct they find distasteful. Giving
the output of such a system, an official status in U.S. law would
be controversial, and rightly so.
4) Getting judges into the business of policing the government's
compliance with international rules would present difficult
challenges in our constitutional system. There are significant
foreign policy implications that cut in favor of a mainly
political, rather than legal, approach here. Indeed, there is a
broader principle in U.S. law, not limited to the trade field,
under which the task of determining what the international
obligations of the United States are rests in the first instance with
the Executive Branch. Allowing lawsuits against the government
to challenge assertedly WTO-inconsistent behavior would put
judges in the position of second-guessing--or possibly even
jumping ahead of-Executive Branch determinations.
I come down on the side of continuing to deny WTO dispute settlement
decisions formal recognition in U.S. law. It might make sense to temper the
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extreme "frontloadedness" of our TPA implementing system, and there may be
different ways to structure the political review that occurs in the wake of an
adverse WTO decision, but some layer of political review remains essential.
This fundamental aspect of the current U.S. approach would be too difficult and
risky to change.
But others will no doubt weigh the factors listed above differently, or
focus on other factors altogether, and reach a different conclusion. I hope the
debate is a vigorous one both during our Q&A this morning and in the forth-
coming discussions over renewing TPA. I thank you for your attention and
look forward to your comments and questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
America has struggled through over a half a century of frustration trying
to create a viable framework for the establishment, modification, and
enforcement of child support obligations. Even then, it took the proverbial
eight hundred pound gorilla in the form of Congress threatening to deny the
states access to federal funds to get states to sign on to the current scheme.'
Given the relative homogeneity of America, how much more challenging is it
to devise a scheme that might be more or less acceptable to a diverse global
community where the essence of the scheme impacts "the family"--the
construct that lies at the heart of a community's social, cultural, religious and
sometimes even political diversity?2
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law, Hamden, Connecticut,
david.rosettenstein@quinnipiac.edu.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669a (1935). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1935) and related regulation
45 C.F. R. §302.56 (2006) (requiring states to establish mandatory guidelines for child support); 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(0 (1935) (requiring all states to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act).
2. As has been pointed out in the context of another international convention on support, the
choice of law rule may regulate both the identities of any claimants and defendants, as well as the amount
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The international community also has fifty years of experience in the same
arena.3 In 1999, dissatisfaction with aspects of the various conventions in force
led a Special Commission operating under the aegis of the Hague Conference
to propose the development of a comprehensive new approach to be embodied
in a Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other
Forms of Family Maintenance.4 This process is well under way.5
One of the problem areas in the development of any such scheme is the
issue of the law applicable to the maintenance obligation. The difficulties in
this area led the Special Commission in 2003 to establish the Working Group
on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.6 The contentious nature
of this project has led to a general strategy that envisages that a choice of law
regime would be included in an optional instrument.7
At the operational level any scheme could be premised on the application
of foreign law or be restricted to domestic law, or involve some structured
combination of these. The operational regime in America generally gives the
law of the issuing state the right to govern the nature, extent, amount and
duration of current payments and other obligations of support, and the payment
of arrearages under the order.8  Because of constitutional due process
requirements, the issuing state must be a state that has personal jurisdiction over
the potential obligor, and this means that this individual either would have
consented to the jurisdiction of the court or, for a variety of different possible
reasons, will have some other significant connections to the state. 9
The Hague Working Group is proposing what it describes as a "cascade"
of potential choice of law rules. 0 Under this arrangement, preference would
of support. See Carol S. Bruch, The 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 817, 821-25 (1992). These themes are not trivial when the potential classes of defendants include
stepparents, sperm and egg donors, birth mothers, "intended" parents, same sex partners who may or may not
be parties to a civil union, or a similar relationship that under a given state's law may recognize them as
parent even as other states decline to do so. In the American context, this list opens up the awkward
possibility of a federally acceptable convention exposing a potential obligor to liability under ajurisdictional
premise which grants authority to a foreign jurisdiction to generate that liability with respect to that obligor
even when any relationship to the child is not only not recognized by federal law, but even may be offensive
to federal law.
3. See William Duncan, The Development of the New Hague Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 38 FAM. L. Q. 663-66 (2004).
4. Id. at 665.
5. Id. at 663.
6. Id. at 683.
7. Id.
8. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) Statutory Text, Prefatory
Note and Commissioners' Comments, 32 FAM L. Q. 385, 490-92 (1998) (discussing § 604 of the Act).
9. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 201 (1996).
10. Report of the Working Group on Applicable Law, at Art. C, para. 10, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
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be given to the country of the maintenance creditor's habitual residence, and in
the event that the "creditor" is unable to obtain maintenance under this regime,
the law of the forum or, if this fails to permit recovery, the law of the parties'
common nationality." The avowed purpose behind this arrangement is to
reinforce an approach in the draft convention designed "to favour the
maintenance creditor in international situations. ''12 This point marks an
interesting and challenging logical elision on the part of the Working Group.
It is one thing to have a convention, targeted to ensuring that established rights
are vindicated, structured to favor the rights holder. It is quite another to use
a presumption of entitlement of a claimant to establish the jurisdictional
premise which will determine whether there is an entitlement in the first place.
Indeed, even if some such an entitlement exists, it is not necessarily obvious
that we should be looking to a "preferred" jurisdiction of the creditor to
determine the extent of the entitlement.' 3 While the idea of using the law of the
forum drew resistance on the basis that it invited forum shopping, 4 quite
appropriately the Working Group points out that using the law of the claimant's
habitual residence "allows a determination of the existence and amount of the
maintenance obligation having regard to the legal and factual circumstances of
the social environment in the country where the creditor lives and engages in
most of his or her activities."' 5 The difficulty is that correspondingly there is a
potential debtor operating in a different country and a different social milieu.
In the absence ofjustification primarily grounded on tackling the Gordian knot,
why the latter's reference framework should be discounted is not clear. Indeed,
even if the "creditor's" law is preferred it is not clear that this will
automatically "favor" the creditor.16
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, Preliminary Document No 22, (June 2006) (reporting for the Attention of the
Special Commission of June 2006 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family
Maintenance) [hereinafter Doc. 22].
11. Id. at Art. C, para. 13, Alternate proposals would allow the law of the forum to be invoked
immediately if the "debtor" has his habitual residence there, or if the proceedings are instituted in such a
forum, or in a third variation, if it is the debtor's habitual residence and the creditor requests that law be
applied.
12. Id. at para. 11.
13. In general, it is possible that one jurisdiction might be preferred for the purpose of identifying
an appropriate claimant or obligor and another jurisdiction used to determine the amount claimable.
14. Doc. 22, supra note 10, at para. 23.
15. Id. at para. 13.
16. For example, one of the traditional problems experienced under the current American regime
is that an obligor is ordered to pay pursuant to child support guidelines existing in an American state. Such
guidelines base the award, at least in part, on the obligor's American income. This opens the door to the
argument that this income, and hence the award, has purchasing power in the obligee's country that far
exceeds the child's needs. See, e.g., Nischal v. Nischal, 879 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. 2005) (comparing
Washington D.C. and India); Gladis v. Gladisova, 856 A.2d 703, 708 (Md. 2003) (comparing Maryland and
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The reason why we should experience some disquiet with a blanket
approach aimed at reinforcing the claimant's position is that any choice of law
rule will be the premise that in one fell swoop may capture the subtleties of any
conflicting international philosophies, and in the process annihilate a significant
Slovakia: the lower cost of living in the child's locality not a proper basis for deviating from the guidelines).
In Gladis the court took the position that the child's needs were a function of the parent's economic position,
and seemed to suggest that the obligor's economic strength should be transferred to the child in the nation
of less wealth. Id. at 712, 714. Such an analysis conflates the theme of needs, cost of living and standard
of living-themes to be returned to below. Gladis, 856 A.2d at 719 (Raker J. dissenting). In the domestic
context, the Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted that it might be unreasonable for a court to ignore the
economic realities of a cost of living differential between obligor and obligee's states. Booth v. Booth, 541
N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (Ohio 1989) (comparing the cost of living in New York and Ohio). Under the proposed
Hague regime this problem might or might not arise depending on whether the country of the creditor's
"habitual residence" premises the award on the creditor's needs in that jurisdiction or on the debtor's
resources. The rational for the convention's proposed choice of law rule suggests it should be the former, but
there is no reason why the claimant's country might not use the obligor's resources as the basis for the
claim-adopting the Gladis perspective. Doc. 22, supra note 10, at para. 13. To make matter's more
complicated, if the basis chosen for the award is one that seeks to ensure that the child enjoys a "standard of
living" that at least equals that of the obligor, there are at least fourteen countries in the world where it
appears to be more expensive than it would be to maintain the same lifestyle in New York City. THE
ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 88 (2006). Here, indeed, the proposed choice of law regime would
"favour" the creditor. Then again, there are at least four or five countries in the world where statistically
speaking it is possible to enjoy a higher "quality of life" for less money than that "life" would cost in New
York. Id. Indeed, as was pointed out in Gladis, in such a scenario the increased purchasing power of U.S.
dollars in the Slovak Republic would mean that while the U. S. obligor generating those dollars was enjoying
a "modest and comfortable life," the child was being placed in the position where she would have the ability
"to live a life of luxury". Gladis, 856 A.2d at 718-19 (Raker J. dissenting). As an additional complication,
the operative jurisdiction may premise the award on the "cost of living" in the claimant's country rather than
on what it takes to maintain a specific "standard of living"--conceptually different benchmarks. See Nischal,
879 A.2d at 815. In one case, a Colorado appellate court held that the guidelines could be deviated from if
to apply them would be "inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate" but that the burden would be on the contestant
to establish that deviation was both reasonable and necessary. In the Interest of A. K., 72 P.3d 402,404-05
(Colo. Ct. App. 2003). The appellate court accepted the trial court's determination that what would be
considered "a normal lifestyle" would be significantly more expensive in Russia than in Colorado, and that
this determination reflected a focus on the child's needs rather than the father's income-though ultimately
the trial court's order was reversed in part due to a failure to fully consider the details of the relevant "living
expenses." See id. at 405. To add insult to injury, a potential obligor may argue that a guideline based award
is inequitable to him because there is a different "standard of living" between his jurisdiction and that of the
claimant. See Edwards v. Dominick, 815 So. 2d 236, 239 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (purporting the difference in
standard of living between Louisiana and South Africa). The converse set of arguments also is recognized.
Here the obligor suggests that the burden ordinarily imposed by the guidelines should be reduced because of
the obligor's relatively high cost of living. See In re Marriage of Dortch, 801 P.2d 279,283 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (describing the high cost of living in Alaska.); In re the Marriage of Welch, 905 P.2d at 132, 136-37
(Mont. 1995) (describing the higher cost of living in Washington D.C. would be an acceptable reason for
deviating from the guidelines if the cost of living is established by proper evidence); In re Marriage of
Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 1998) (obligor's higher cost of living in California not a basis for
departure from the guidelines).
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number of them. And these subtleties, as we shall see at some length with
respect to America, can be very subtle indeed. Moreover, to offset the intuitive
appeal of an asserted claim for child support, it is worth remembering that a
foreign support order imposed on "unsuitable" criteria can expose an American
obligor to what at best may be a debt that cannot be satisfied or eliminated and
at worst to the prospect of incarceration.
The rest of the article, through a discussion of some aspects of the child
support obligation in the context of the American experience, aims to reveal
some of the sorts of concerns and nuances that are at stake as competing
jurisdictional perspectives come into play.
II. CHILD SUPPORT: WHOSE Ox is BEING GORED?
As a basic proposition, if the only interest involved in a child support
award is what benefits the child, the governing legal regime in most instances
should be one that produces the highest possible award because, when it comes
to child support, virtually without exception, money matters. 
1 7
In reality, the policy considerations impacting child support, and
parenthetical questions related to our later discussion of whether to demand
income optimization, reflect the concerns of four constituencies, namely, the
parent caring for the child (the residential parent), the non-residential parent,
17. See, e.g., Martin Dooley & Jennifer Stewart, Family Income and Child Outcomes in Canada,
37 CAN. J. ECON. 898 (2004) (positive relationship between income and child outcomes); Joe Blanden & Paul
Gregg, Family Income and Educational Attainment : A Review ofApproaches and Evidence for Britain, 20
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 245 (2004) (family income has a causal relationship with educational
attainment); Louise Sequin, et al., Understanding the Dimensions of Socioeconomic Status that Influence
Toddlers' Health: Unique Impact of Lack of Money for Basic Needs in Quebec's Birth Cohort, 59 J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMM. HEALTH 42 (2005) (lack of money for basic needs has a significant impact on
toddlers' health); Don Kerr & Roderic Beaujot, Family Relations, Low Income, and Child Outcomes: A
Comparison of Canadian Children in Intact, Step-, and Lone-Parent Families, 43 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 134
(2002) (low income has significant impact on childhood difficulties in lone-parent and step-families); E. Jane
Costello, et al., Relationships Between Poverty and Psychopathology, A Natural Experiment, 290 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2023 (2003) (poverty has major effect on children's conduct and oppositional defiant disorders);
Pamela A. Morris & Lisa A. Gennetian, Identifying the Effects of Income on Children 's Development Using
Experimental Data, 65 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 716 (2003) (some suggestion increased income
improves development of low-income children with regard to school attachment and positive social behavior);
Lawrence M. Berger, Income, Family Structure, and ChildMaltreatment Risk, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES
REV. 725 (2004) (suggests income and family structure affects family's overall risk of child maltreatment);
Jay Bainbridge, et al., Who Gets an Early Education? Family Income and the Enrollment of Three- to five-
year-oldsfrom 1968 to 2000, 86 Soc. So. Q. 724 (2005) (strong link between family income and early
education enrollment); Erik Plug & Wim Vijverberg, Does Family Income Matterfor Schooling Outcomes?
Using Adoptees as a Natural Experiment, 115 EcON. J. 879 (2005) (family income has a significant effect
on school attainment); Jake M. Najman, et al., The Generational Transmission of Socioeconomic Inequalities
in Child Cognitive Development and Emotional Health, 58 SOC. SC. & MED. 1147 (2004) (family income
related to child cognitive development and emotional health).
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the child, and society at large."8 Those considerations relevant to us were
articulated by the American Law Institute (ALI), after almost a decade of
analysis, as follows:
1) That parents share income with a child in order that the child
enjoy
a) A minimum decent standard of living when the combined
income of the parents is sufficient to achieve such result
without impoverishing either parent; and
b) A standard of living not grossly inferior to that of either
parent;
2) That a child not suffer loss of important life opportunities that
the parents are able to provide without undue hardship to
themselves or their other dependents;
3) That residential parents be treated fairly;
4) That non-residential parents be treated fairly;
5) That child-support rules not discourage the labor-force
participation or vocational training of either parent;
6) That child-support rules take into account a child's need for
care;
7) That child-support rules be readily comprehensible, and
administrable, and reflect popular understanding of the duties
and obligations of parents to a child and to each other.19
III. CHILD SUPPORT: GROUNDING THE CALCULATION
When it comes to determining the amount of child support due, there are
four stock approaches that appear on the American radar screen.
The first requires the non-residential parent to contribute child support to
a level that equalizes the standard of living of the residential and non-residential
households.2" Although widely advocated in feminist literature, no American
jurisdiction formally implements it. 2
The second, the Percentage of Obligor Income model, establishes the
award solely on the basis of a certain percentage of the obligor's income.22 The
amount awarded is simply a function of the demands placed on the resources
18. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (AI. Law. Inst. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
19. Id. § 3.04
20. Id. at 574.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 572.
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of the obligor.23 The obligee parent's "performance" only impacts the
aggregate resources available to the household.
The third is the Income Sharing model. The award is a percentage of the
parents' combined incomes, the percentage being determined by what an
economic analysis suggests would have been assigned to support a child were
that combined income to be found in an intact household.24 The obligation is
to pay, pro rata, the same percentage of each parent's income after the family
breakdown. 25 Here, the residential parent's performance directly impacts the
amount available to that parent and the child and also affects the burden on the
obligor, but only to the extent that the percentage of the combined income
attributable to child support varies with the aggregate amount of the parents'
incomes. 26 Each parent's contribution to child support varies in proportion to
that parent's income. Because the relationship between income and obligation
is not linear, as the combined income goes up, the burden for each parent
relative to his or her own income declines, and in this model it declines an
equivalent proportion for each parent. Accordingly, in percentage terms, the
cost/benefit consequences of "performance" by a parent are equal. This
proposition is only true in absolute terms if the incomes and standards of living
of the households are equivalent-which ordinarily they won't be-so, again,
"under performance" by one parent may result in both the child and the
residential parent being under-supported, and in fairness terms the allocation
of the relative burdens in absolute terms may be unfair. However, on the plus
side, this model permits avoiding a work disincentive for the residential
parent.27
A drawback of the Income Sharing model is that it does not lend itself to
producing an equivalent standard of living in each household. As a result, the
model may impose relative and absolute economic suffering on the child. This
possibility supplied the ALl with ajustification for casting aside concerns about
creating a work disincentive.28
23. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.
24. Id. at 572.
25. Id. In an international context, one of the criticisms of the application of a state law derived
guideline developed on an Income Shares model is that the economics of the model will be based on United
States' data indicating what parents in an intact household spend on their children, and that it is unrealistic
to apply these data to the entire world in an attempt to equalize standards of living. Gladis, 856 A.2d at 717
(Raker J. dissenting).
26. Id.
27. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.05A, at cmt. i. One argument is that, in time, such a
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The ALI child support model starts with an Income Sharing analysis but
it then adds a supplemental payment from the obligor.29 This supplemental
payment declines as the income of the residential household increases. Thus,
in this model, economic under-performance by the residential parent increases
the burden on the obligor, while any adverse effect on the residential
household's resources arising from the division of the notional joint household
economy is dampened by the supplement from the obligor. Accordingly, the
model, in inter-parent fairness terms, is sensitive to under-performance by the
residential parent, although vis-a-vis the child the impact of under-performance
is nullified-at least if the non-residential parent has the resources to pay the
supplement.
IV. CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS AND IMPUTATION AND OPTIMIZATION
As we saw, the ALI Principles identified four constituencies with a vested
interest in a child support award-the residential parent, the non-residential
parent, the child and society at large. The Principles accept that the
constituencies' values and interests may be competing so that it is difficult to
fully implement any one of them.3"
The underlying spectrum of policy considerations and the various
approaches (suggested and used) to calculate child support open the door to our
next level of inquiry. The establishment of a child support award inevitably
requires the legal regime to determine the resources out of which that award
may be made. Typically, the question we have to answer is what is each
parent's "income?" For this purpose, and for the purpose of our present
discussion, should we allow, or require, the relevant legal regime to impute
income to a parent? And, as yet another layer in the analysis, even if
imputation in permitted in principle, are there limits on the extent to which this
should occur? By way of an example, can the regime require that an individual
qualified as a neuro-surgeon work as such, or just work as a general surgeon,
or work as a general practitioner, or just work? What if the parent in question
is the residential parent and wishes to remain at home to care for the child?
29. Id. § 3.05A, at cmt b. The formula envisages a base amount, which is the percentage of the
obligor's income that if paid would ensure all parties the same standard of living, if the parents had equal
incomes. The supplement is an additional amount aimed at ensuring that the child enjoys a minimum decent
standard of living, if the combined incomes of the parents are capable of achieving that result without
impoverishing either parent, as well as ensuring that the child has a standard of living not grossly inferior to
that of either parent. As the residential parent's income increases the supplement decreases. When the
parents' incomes become equal, the supplement disappears. Id.
30. Id. § 3.04, cmt. a.
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A. The Public Purse and Other Society Interests
There is another dimension to this problem that is particularly relevant in
the international context. Single-parent family poverty is a universal
phenomenon across all developed economies regardless of individual cultural
or social characteristics. That is, it is the economics as such that is flawed in
a way that can only be remedied by public fund transfers.3 In such a situation,
the essential balance that needs to be struck is one between the public purse and
family needs, not between the non-residential parent and the family.
Transported to the international arena, the choice of law rule ultimately has the
power to answer the question of whether a particular country's public funds
will be burdened?32 Not totally surprisingly in this regard, as far as the Hague
drafting process is concerned, one choice of law rule seems to have made its
way directly into the tentative draft of the convention itself without too much
fuss. It provides that "[t]he right of a public body to seek reimbursement of a
benefit provided to the creditor in place of maintenance shall be governed by
the law to which the body is subject."33 It should be noted, however, that even
where the transfer of public funds is required, the legal regime's stand on
imputation and optimization may dictate the magnitude of that transfer and the
extent of any demand for reimbursement. The fact that any paying "public
body" is likely to be one in the "creditor's" country of habitual residence
suggests that there should be no inconsistencies on the issue of imputation and
optimization as between the creditor's basic claim and the public body's
demand for reimbursement. But this need not necessarily be the case. If, for
example, the public body's initial contribution is capped, its regulatory regime
should not be in a position to demand optimization or even imputation beyond
the extent of the public contribution. In such a context, should the "creditor"
31. See id. § 3.04, at cmt. h.
32. Ordinarily, this is likely to be a one-dimensional problem involving a decision as to whether
the authorities of the court's own jurisdiction should support the child. In the international scene, and
certainly with respect to American states, one is not likely to see a system receptive to the idea that the public
authority in an American state, at the behest of a court in a foreign country, could be obligated to support a
non-resident child in that other country. Of course, it is conceivable that an obligor, having paid child
support, is left so impoverished that he or she comes to depend on public resources in one form or another.
Ordinarily this should not happen because support guidelines are supposed to have an adequate self-support
reserve built into them. The realities may be otherwise.
33. Tentative Draft Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms
ofFamily Maintenance, at Art. 32(2), Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document
no.16 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Doc. 16]. Interestingly, this structure allows the conceptual framework in
which the public body operates to determine the legitimacy of the obligee's claim. In the international
context, for example, this would allow entities in countries with broad social support infrastructures to
establish a legitimate claim against an American obligor in a context where an American public entity may
not have provided support to the obligee.
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be entitled to demand more of a potential obligor, or should the public body's
limit define the magnitude of a "deserving" claim, at least where imputation or
optimization is involved?34
Beyond the above concerns, the starting point is that society ought not to
be required to support a child whose parents have adequate resources to do so. 5
Over and above that, society is concerned to see that sufficient support is
provided for the care, nutrition, education and well-being of children as the next
generation.36 In this context, the ALI sees economic inadequacy of a parent as,
not only injurious to the child, but also as an unwise under-investment in an
important social resource.37
From the American perspective, America rejects, as a social ethic, a public
role of primary guarantor of a child's economic well-being.38 At best, the
public purse's function is subsidiary. Accordingly, to the extent that the child's
needs place a demand on that purse, the obligor is unlikely to be allowed to
avoid necessary optimization. But, in turn, the most the state can demand is
performance to a level that removes the burden from the public purse. Ideally,
the level of state support would be one which advances the totality of the state's
interests, such as those related to health and education, never mind the child's
ideal interests. But, this is not likely to be the case. At best, state interest
justified optimization demands are likely to be limited to those necessary to
plug an obvious hole-referenced to some poverty standard-in a still leaky
dike.
B. The Child's Interests and Parental Autonomy
Ideally, a child should be left unharmed financially by family dissolution.
However, ordinarily, two households cannot live as cheaply as one. As the
child and the residential parent share a common household, usually it is not
possible to hold the child harmless economically and not do the same for the
residential parent. The effect, in concept, is to impose the economic costs of
the dissolution entirely on the non-residential parent.39 Recognizing this fact,
the ALI adopts two reference standards. First, the child should enjoy a
minimum decent standard of living-assuming the possibility of the parents
34. From an American perspective such a "limit" might be seen as particularly problematic in
instances where the foreign country's level of public support exceeds what is considered "acceptable" in
America.
35. See, e.g., Kramer v. Kramer, No. FA-91 032 1225-S, Slip. Op. at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
19, 1992).
36. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 cmt. b.
37. Id.
38. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. h.
39. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. c.
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mustering sufficient resources to do that.4" Second, the child should not suffer
disproportionately compared to other family members.4
Sometimes, it may be possible to decouple the child's economic interests
from those of the residential household. The most notable example of this is
with respect to "life opportunities," especially those relating to education. The
concern is that parents under-invest in a child who is not in a common
household.42 Thus, we can adopt a position that a child should be left unharmed
if the parents can "afford" to provide a given opportunity.43 Since the basis of
this "entitlement" is "affordability," not willingness, this conceptualization lays
the source of any resource generation demand notionally at the door of society,
but actually in the hands of the demanding (usually residential) parent. The
effect is that one parent loses economic autonomy to the other. The extent of
that loss is regulated by an external determination of what a parent is capable
of doing to "afford" the entitlement. In this process we need to determine
whether "affordability" should be determined on the basis of imputed income."
There is a further limiting condition. Since the benchmark is a potential loss
by the child, the objective should not demand performance beyond that which
would have been expected if the family had remained intact. Accordingly,
production at the level that was achieved in the marriage will suffice, unless
enhanced performance reasonably could have been anticipated in an intact
family to meet the demands of future "opportunities." Nevertheless, the open-
ended question of what are legitimate "opportunities" potentially exposes the
obligor to significant pressure towards optimization.
A relevant value that may be more uniquely American is one which posits
that when it comes to dealing with a higher income parent, that parent should
be allowed to benefit disproportionately from the fruits of his or her own labors
relative to other family members.45 This value enjoys substantial, but not
unanimous, support in America and is implicit in the formulation of all current
American child support rules.4 6 While the comments to the ALl Principles
suggest that the value generally is not subject to compromise in an interest
40. Id.
41. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. c.
42. Id. at cmt. j.
43. See id.
44. Courts have pointed out that any guideline based structure is premised on "affordability" rather
than the child's actual needs. See Nischal, 879 A.2d at 816 (quoting Mascaro v. Mascaro, 803 A.2d 1186
(Pa. 2002)).
45. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. d.
46. Id. Arguably a similar tenet can be found in the Scandinavian countries to the extent that they
consider that maintenance should only be granted to a divorced spouse in exceptional circumstances. Doc.
22, supra note 10, at para. 36.
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balancing process, in reality the extent to which the higher income parent is left
with a higher standard of living is a result of the impact of the other competing
interests.47 Thus, parental autonomy reflected in a decision to attempt to
optimize income in the parent's own interests may be undercut by competing
demands. Here we face an interesting boundary problem. Even if competing
demands cannot compel a parent to optimize income, can these interests assert
a priority claim when and if the income is optimized? Should the answer be
specific to the situation and simply reflect a balance between the "utility" of the
claim and the burden of the resource generator's self-imposed optimization
efforts?
C. The Residential Parent's Interests
The residential parent is concerned to not carry a disproportionate share
of the out-of-pocket costs attributable to raising the child. In addition, this
parent should not suffer a disadvantage through opportunity cost losses
associated with child rearing. We could tackle this latter issue by valuing the
child services rendered, or we could do this by acknowledging the extent to
which the child rearing function limits the residential parent's market
earnings." Both of these premises lay a foundation for a claim against the other
parent's reserve capacity to enhance his or her income. Unfortunately, both
premises open the door to opportunism on the part of the residential parent.
The residential parent's interests have to be balanced against the non-residential
parents' interests and in "appropriate" cases yield to them.49
The Principles tread carefully when it comes to the residential parent's
employment. They argue that it is important that child support rules not
"discourage," as distinct from encourage, the residential parent's labor force
participation." During the child's minority, the gainful employment of the
residential parent "to the extent consistent with the needs of the child"'" serves
everyone's interests. After that minority, it is in the interests of the residential
parent to have maximized the quality and quantity of past labor force
participation. 2 Two aspects of this justify comment. First, the residential
parent's "obligation" is not couched in imperative terms. While the benefits of
market participation are recognized, optimization is not demanded. Moreover,
these benefits can be offset by the needs of the child, the arbiter of which the
47. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. d.
48. Id. at crnt. e.
49. Id.
50. Id. at cmt. I.
51. Id. at cmt. e.
52. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. e.
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Principles fail to identify. Structurally, the burden seems to be placed at the
door of the obligor to demonstrate that the residential parent's non-market-
related contributions to the child's needs are unwarranted.
The Principles do provide some glosses. If there is no child under the age
of six in the residential household income should be imputed.53 That is, a move
in the direction of optimization should be demanded, to a level that the
residential parent could reasonably earn "considering the parent's residential
responsibility for the children of the parties.. . ."" The Principles start with
a premise that they are not willing "to second guess the hard choices facing
parents with residential responsibility for preschool children."55 This is partly
because of the difficulty of securing adequate day care and meeting employer
expectations while serving as a residential parent.56 Accordingly, with a child
below six, the safe harbor is absolute and the residential parent does not even
have to try to be fair to the obligor, and indeed is given this permission without
any examination of whether the choice made by the residential parent actually
is reasonable with regard to the interests of the child. It simply is assumed that
it is.
The ALl suggests that receipt of child support by a residential parent does
not seem to discourage labor market participation. 7 Various reasons have been
advanced to explain this phenomenon. First, child support payments are
uncertain and market participation is a means of hedging this risk.
Additionally, this participation may reflect cooperation in the form of burden-
sharing by the residential parent to encourage continued support flow. This
may explain why there is an enormous return per dollar in the child's
educational outcomes-the residential parent seeks to please the obligor
through the child's performance, complimented by enhanced participation by
the payor in the child's life to monitor the payor's investment. 58 But there is the
possibility that this result is just a function of the dollars rather than behavioral
responses to the dollars. After all, we know that generally outcomes are more
favorable the higher the household income. Even accepting the Principles
analysis, if its chain of causation is correct, it suggests that there might be a
justification for moving from a neutral position of not discouraging market
participation to one of affirmatively encouraging it.
53. Id. at § 3.14 at cmt. e.
54. Id. § 3.15(l)(a).
55. Id. § 3.15 at cmt. b.
56. Id.
57. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. I.
58. Id. (citing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 225 (1993); Jonathan R. Veum, Interrelation of Child Support, Visitation, and Hours of
Work, 115(6) MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 40-47 (June 1992)).
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The choices involved in work-derived income optimization are seen as
different for residential and non-residential parents. For the latter, the choice
is between work and leisure. With the former, it is a choice between
exchanging market labor for child-rearing. Given the dual identities of the
residential parent, especially one who in the intact family was the primary
parent, the Principles suggest that residential parents are more sensitive to work
disincentives than non-residential parents, even where the residential parent has
a long history of attachment to the labor market.59 In the ALI view, the interests
of children and residential parents almost inevitably will produce work
disincentives, but that rules should seek to restrict such situations to the
unavoidable minimum.6"
That said, the Principles require that child support rules take account of the
child's need for care.6 The ALI position is that the interests of children and
society are not always served by the residential parent's gainful employment
and that, from the child's perspective, the residential parent's personal
provision of needed care, particularly in the early years, may be a legitimate
trade-off against market employment-although, as the child ages, the balance
of preference should shift in favor of market participation.62 Given the inability
of child support statutes to be particularly nuanced, it seems legitimate to ask
whether it is appropriate to premise the entire support structure on a
presumptive entitlement to not participate in the market, especially given the
acknowledged pressure that the residential parent's dual identity creates in
favor of non-participation. Of course it may not be economically rational to
participate in the market, as where the transaction costs exceed the returns.
Even here, there may be reasons to justify apparent economic irrationality, such
as where a short term loss while in education will generate increased earning
capacity to the advantage of the residential parent, the child and the non-
residential parent. Generalized, this proposition highlights the fact that
optimization is both a concept and a process, so that it may become difficult to
evaluate competing demands for optimization occurring in different contexts.
Thus, asking for restructuring of an investment portfolio to achieve higher
yields cannot necessarily be judged in the same way as would an assertion that
housing costs should be reduced to enhance liquidity.63 In such an environment,
consistency in relative burden imposition becomes difficult.
59. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18 § 3.04 at cmt. 1.
60. See id.
61. See generally PRINCIPLES.
62. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. n.
63. Id. § 3.14(3)-(5). Other troublesome scenarios include voluntary unemployment or under-
employment and the appearance of a new spouse or partner for the residential parent. Id.
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D. The Role of Fairness
"Fairness" requires that the residential parent not carry, disproportionately,
the costs of child rearing. 64 In turn, the non-residential parent's interests are
recognized by giving respect, but not a controlling deference, to the idea that
a parent need not contribute more than would have been done in an intact
household; by not requiring this parent to share earnings to the point of
equalizing household income; and by this parent not being required to suffer
"pointlessly" by virtue of the support obligation.65 Apart from the fact that
international support disputes involve countries with differing costs of living,
which intrinsically may enhance the risks of an "excessive" demand, the above
concerns raise numerous optimization related issues.
To start with, economic under-performance by the residential parent can
make that parent's share of the costs disproportionate, especially regarding
fixed child related costs. On the other side of the coin, as the approach relative
to the non-residential parent is less concerned with what is proportionately
reasonable, and focuses more on what is necessary for the child, and since the
residential parent controls the household budget, that parent, through under
performance, is in a position to increase the pressure on the non-residential
parent to optimize income--even if the latter ends up disproportionately
burdened.
Beyond these considerations, in the domain of "fairness," even when the
household no longer contains a child under six, the Principles lean in favor of
the residential parent. The ALl sees the concept of imputing income to the
residential parent, that is invoking a process that moves in the direction of
optimization, as inherently problematic because it reflects a legal judgment
about how the residential parent should allocate time between gainful
employment and child rearing-"a matter normally left to the decision making
of parents., 66 The linguistic ambiguity in the use of "parents" in this context
exposes an interesting hiatus in principle. No doubt ajoint decision by parents
in an intact household as to market participation is appropriately theirs-at least
short of neglect. It is less clear that the underlying premise continues to be
viable in a post-dissolution universe when the consequence is an obligation
imposed on the obligor, backed, at worst, by the sanction of incarceration and
which at best generates a debt that cannot be shed. To permit this situation
seems to attribute such an absolute significance to the child care function that
a case by case analysis would seem to be a better approach. While the ALl
calls for such an analysis with children beyond the age of five, even here any
64. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. k.
65. Id.
66. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.15 at cmt. b.
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pressure to work is mitigated by the residential parent's responsibilities for the
parties' children.67 Indeed, the ALl notes that to the extent that income is
imputed to the residential parent, it penalizes the child economically for the
parent's decision to give the child more, rather than less, direct parental care.6"
Apparently overlooked is the fact that it is the residential parent's decision
which leads to this result. Implicit therefore in this structure is an acceptance
of the fact that the residential parent's choice inherently is legitimate-
consequently, the Principles accept that the imputation of income to the
residential parent should be undertaken with even greater caution than is
accorded imputation of income to the non-residential obligor.69
Under the ALI scheme, imputing income to the residential parent has the
effect of reducing the obligor's financial burden and, in the event of non-
production by the residential parent, also reduces the resources available to the
child.7" The process, however, does not expose the residential parent to legal
sanctions. The ALI's position is that there is less incentive to shirk on the part
of the residential parent because that parent shares any resources earned with
the child.7 What the Principles do not acknowledge fully is that this
moderating influence is offset where the obligee sees a possibility of "under
performance" being compensated for by increased demands on the non-
residential obligor. What the Principles draw attention to is that the residential
parent may see a trade-off between caring for the child and employment.72 The
difficulty with reinforcing the legitimacy of any such analysis is that it relies
initially on the residential parent's subjective perception (and perhaps
ultimately a court's perception) of that parent's "worth" to the child.73 This
arrangement, in turn, can be countered or reinforced by the burdens, or lack
thereof, imposed on the obligor.
Overriding the residential parent's prioritization of commitments becomes
even harder if personalized care by a parent is perceived as socially normative
behavior,74 that is, if, in principle, any market driven substitution for those
67. Id. § 3.15(1)(a).
68. Id. § 3.15 at cmt. b.
69. Id.
70. See id. § 3.14 at cmt. e.
71. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.14 at cmt. e.
72. Id.
73. Even if a child care program is subsidized, values and beliefs about parenting may obstruct take
up of this benefit. See Edward D. Lowe & Thomas S. Weisner, You have to Push It--Who's Gonna raise
your Kids?: Situating Child Care and Child Care Subsidy Use in the Daily Routines of Lower Income
Families, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 143 (2004).
74. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 72 (1989) (assuming the
parental responsibility is a "traditional ideal").
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residential services has no intrinsic legitimacy. The above analysis results in
the treatment of a residential parent being reviewed exclusively in the realm of
fairness between the adults without an examination of whether any failure to
generate resources works to the advantage of the child. Accordingly, any lack
of optimization may produce operational unfairness-a fact that the Principles
do not seem willing to acknowledge.75 The absence of a recognized market
based exchange value for the services rendered by the residential parent, except
to the extent that the parent acknowledges such an exchange, means that we
have no reference standard for "fairness." And that is just as between the
adults. As indicated above, this basic posture forecloses the possibility of the
evaluation of the residential parent's earnings-related conduct with reference
to the child's interests, not just in terms of services rendered to the child by the
residential parent, but also with respect to additional marginal benefits to the
child in terms of the possibility that more revenue could purchase services that
the residential parent cannot provide in the immediate term, as well as in regard
to that parent's opportunity costs in the form of lost savings or underdeveloped
human capital that might endure to the child's benefit in the future. That said,
the literature indicates that not all forms of work benefit the children of all
parents. The consequences for a child of employment of a hard-to-place worker
parent in a low prestige job are not necessarily positive.76
E. The Non-Residential Parent's Interests
As to the non-residential parent, America has rejected the notion that child
support is a voluntary contribution.77 Rather, it is a legal duty. Nevertheless,
an element of voluntariness remains where the non-residential parent does not
have to contribute more to the support of the child than notionally would have
been contributed if the child was living in an intact household.78 Conceptually,
this is the basis of one of the standard models of child support. Intrinsically,
this approach does not hold the child harmless, nor prevent unequal suffering,
75. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.14 at cmt. e.
76. Thus, even with positive psychological benefits for the residential parent, there may be adverse
impacts on her parenting style if the work is low prestige. See generally C. Cybele Raver, Does Work Pay
Psychologically as well as Economically? The Role ofEmployment in Predicting Depressive Symptoms and
Parenting Among Low-income Families, 74 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1720 (2003). Also, if the parent can be
classified as "very-hardest-to-employ," following that parent's employment, a child's school engagement may
decrease and aggressive behavior increase, even with substantial increases in parents' employment and
income. See Hirokazwe Yoshikawa et al., Effects of Earnings-supplement Policies on Adult Economic and
Middle-childhood Outcomes Differfor the 'Hardest to Employ', 74 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1500 (2003).This
result is contrary to that encountered where the parent is just "moderately hard to employ." See id. at 1518.
77. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. f.
78. Id.
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nor guarantee a decent standard of living. Accordingly, in part, the approach
may reflect the non-residential parent's interests.79 The approach also
legitimates the idea that any duty only extends to supporting the child rather
than benefiting the residential parent-although factually "spillover" is almost
inevitable.8" However, this approach does not determine how much income
ought to be generated. It only defines how income that is generated should be
distributed. Thus, it just supplies the foundation on which optimization issues
play out.
The ALI proposes a support formula based on the marginal difference in
spending by parents with notionally equal incomes, compared to what a
childless couple would spend on themselves.8 This approach seeks to strike a
balance between the non-residential parent's interests, the child's interests in
not suffering, and the residential parent's interests in not contributing dispro-
portionately to support.8" This conceptualization does not inform any optimiza-
tion analysis. Nevertheless, the underlying interests do. Thus, parents can be
expected to perform to a level that obviates the child's suffering. This does not
tell us the extent to which each can be expected to perform relative to the other,
but if we accept the legitimacy of a non-residential parent's interest in only
sharing income with the child and not with the residential parent, this does
suggest a boundary marker against which optimization demands may be
measured.
Some questions almost have a metaphysical character-and the ALI
analysis has few answers. Should a non-residential parent's optimization
burden be reduced because of fewer opportunities to enjoy a relationship with
the child? Should such a claim be offset by the residential parent's increased
responsibility and additional child-care duties?83 Also, the ALl rejects factoring
in remarriage.8 ' The ALI's perspective is that child support and child-care
obligations are a form of negative dower for both parents and thus don't justify
a relative adjustment.85 Apparently, conceptually, this negative dower would
not support a demand for optimization. Moreover, where an obligor "acquires"
subsequent children to support, in the ALI view they should be treated like any
existing child, except, arguably, to the extent that the additional mouth pushes
one or other household into a zone of absolute financial hardship (based on
79. Id. But to the extent that the obligation emerges from guidelines that require a payment that
exceeds the child's reasonable needs, these interests are discounted. See Nischal, 879 A.2d at 815.
80. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04.
81. Id. at 570.
82. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. f.
83. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. g.
84. Id. § 2.15.
85. See generally Id.
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some percentage of the poverty level).86 Such a scenario would seem to support
a demand for income optimization by the person who "generated" the marginal
burden in order to abate this situation as far as possible.
Custody awards generally result in the child being placed with the parent
who historically performed that role. Frequently, that parent's market value
will have suffered by virtue of that role. This negative handicapping may be
compounded by a post-divorce supervisory function. The combination of these
child-derived penalties may adversely impact the child's economic well-being.
To what extent can we make demands on the income performance of the non-
residential parent to offset this? The Principles, at least as far as child support
is concerned, limit the demands to such performance as avoids a gross-disparity
between the economic circumstances of the child and those of a higher-income
non-residential parent.87 The goal is not to equalize household incomes, but to
strike a balance between ensuring that the child not suffer disproportionately,
and capping the non-residential parent's outlay at a level hypothetically found
in an intact family.88 This might dictate enhanced performance, but not
necessarily optimization. And there might be further limits. Thus, a critical
goal of the ALl child support framework is that it not discourage labor force
participation by either parent.89 As to the non-residential parent, this produces
an analysis suggesting that any disincentive flowing from the obligor retaining
less of his earnings is offset by an encouragement to work harder to reach a
desired level of income. However, this analysis holds up only as long as the
obligation is set a level where there is a marginal return for the obligor on the
additional effort.9" Additionally, the analysis relies on an assumption that the
physical or psychological effort involved in producing income at the margin
remains the same. If this is not true, additional labor force participation may
be rejected-that is, even if additional income is possible, there is no necessary
linear relationship between the economic incentives to optimize income and the
psychological/physical resources to do so. This is somewhat analogous to the
residential parent's dual identity dilemma--discussed above-which resolves
itself into a tension between what the actor can do and what the actor wants to
do.
The Principles suggest that support determinations be calculated to
enhance vocational training, even at the expense of short-term income
optimization, especially for a residential parent who already may be under-
invested in human capital and who, through child care and earning
86. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.16 at cmt. c.
87. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. i.
88. Id.
89. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. 1.
90. Id.
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responsibilities, may be hampered in efforts to acquire additional training.91
The system should encourage investment in such training in a way that makes
worthwhile gains for both the residential household and the non-residential
parent.92 This suggests, at least vis-A-vis the non-residential parent, that the
system should be less encouraging of vocational training at his relative expense
unless the effect, in due course, is to reduce his burden, or unless we can justify
his contribution to the training through the ultimate marginal benefit to the
child in the form of enhanced residential household resources. Also, the
Principles only encourage vocational training, not education for its aesthetic
value or the cultural enrichment of the residential household.93 Followed to its
logical conclusion, child care provided by the residential parent for the parent's
psychic benefit and at the expense of income generation, should not be
encouraged. And, we should take a hard look at any justification by the
residential parent for non-optimization, where that justification is based on that
parent's determination of the child's "needs" especially where those "needs"
do not demonstrably demand economic under-performance.
V. THE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE-ANOTHER EIGHT HUNDRED POUND
GORILLA ELIMINATES THE CAMEL'S NOSE
Despite all the subtlety extracted above, the choice of law rule may dictate
the application of an approach that would suggest the above analysis is
pointless.
The Principles noted the need for the system to be administrable and
understandable. This, in turn, readily elides into a premise that sees an
overarching goal as being achieving efficiency within the child support system.
This would demand that, wherever possible, individualized determinations be
minimized.94 In the American context, this emerges as an argument that the
opportunity to argue for deviations from established child support guidelines
should be limited.95 Thus, in the few reported cases where the arguments have
91. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. m.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Thus, in In re the Marriage of Andersen, 895 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), the
court pointed out that a finding that one parent has a higher cost of living will not ordinarily justify deviation
from the guidelines and that the guideline commission had considered a specific provision to permit a
deviation from the guidelines in such a circumstance but had concluded that ordinarily implementing such
complex criteria "would only serve to make support awards less uniform and predictable and more subject
to individual whim and manipulation. Id. at 1164. That said, the court acknowledged that the failure to
expressly include a higher cost of living as a reason for deviation from the guidelines did not preclude doing
so where "the difference in cost of living alone would render application of the guidelines inequitable, unjust,
or inappropriate." Id. at 1165.
95. See, e.g., Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. 1992) (stating that "[tihe clear intent of
[Vol. 13:2
Rosettenstein
been raised that the guidelines should not be used because they produce an
"excessive" award relative to what the circumstances in the foreign country
would demand, an efficiency principle has been used to block further
analysis-why let the "nose" of detailed analysis intrude?96
True, when in comes to interstate arguments along the same line in
America, there seems to be more willingness to entertain an argument for
deviation based on "cost of living" differential considerations and the like.97
While the reason for the distinction between the national and international
approaches is not clearly articulated, one cannot help guessing that what is
"foreign" is almost inevitably deemed to be more of a problem.98 This posture
very easily slides over into one which will be readily embraced by American
legal institutions, namely, that any mechanism should be simple and involve an
efficient use of judicial and administrative resources. Nothing gets closer to
achieving this goal than the rote implementation of established child support
guidelines even if these tend to produce inappropriate or even absurd results.99
It is difficult to imagine an American jurisdiction willingly departing from its
domestic standards towards imputation and optimization (or lack thereof) in the
face of countervailing pressures from overseas on criteria that would in any
event have to be independently established-at least unless the domestic regime
absolutely insists that such a departure be undertaken. If this hypothesis is
correct, the argument of efficient use ofjudicial resources will swallow all the
other nuanced analyses, except to the extent that they are already embedded in
existing guidelines. What plays in Peoria will always be right for Peoria.
The fact that the courts even now seem inclined to follow the path of least
resistance when it comes to support determinations with an international
component would be yet another argument for caution in selecting the choice
of law rule. In the international sphere the right rule would seem to be one that
entertains subtleties.
the guidelines.., was to do away with individual case-by-case determinations ofjust what constitutes the
reasonable needs and expenses of the particular parties involved and thus to limit the trial court's
discretion.").
96. "One of the primary purposes of the Guidelines 'was to limit the role of trial courts in deciding
the specific amount of child support to be awarded in different cases, by limiting the necessity for factual
findings that had been required under pre-guidelines case law."' Gladis, 856 A.2d at 712 (citing Petrini v.
Petrini, 648 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994)). "Allowing a deviation from the Guidelines based on the standards of
living in different localities would encourage trial courts to examine those circumstances on a case-by-case
basis and, no doubt, depart from the guidelines more frequently." Gladis, 856 A.2d at 712.
97. Id. at 711-12.
98. "How, for instance, could fact finders consistently determine the precise differences in standards
of living in two different countries, given that the value of currency changes constantly and that middle-class
living conditions in Maryland may be considered poverty or extravagance elsewhere?" Id. at 712-13.
99. Thus in Gladis the guidelines required the obligor to pay $497 per month, while at most the
actual expenses of the child appeared to be no more than $280 per month. Id. at 717 (Raker J. dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Absurd results may arise if we impose blanket obligations to optimize or
impute income. Thus, an American income generator may asked to produce
"too much," and conversely imposing an optimization burden on an individual
where wages are very low may be fair as a matter of abstract principle but
ridiculous in absolute terms as far as the relative burden on the parents is
concerned.
Ideally, any choice of law rule would identify a legal regime, which under
the circumstances, enabled the interests of the relevant constituencies to be
addressed with subtlety. However, a variable choice of law rule involving a
case by case analysis of available regimes would be highly inefficient. Instead,
the key would seem to be to adopt a choice of law rule but include a number of
limited defenses, or conditional rule changes, built into the choice of law
protocol and embodying as much refinement as is deemed desirable. For
example, we could select a legal regime based on the claimant's habitual
residence, but subject to a limiting condition to the extent that any burden
imposed on an obligor could not demand performance beyond current activities
unless the claimant could establish that performance at some other level was a
matter of compelling necessity. Even such a structure may be too detailed.
Perhaps in the interests of gaining acceptability and minimizing the need to
impute income, the choice of law rule should simply be subject to a blanket
limitation that no more may be sought than the claimant's actual reasonable
costs to maintain the obligor's standard of living, if the cost of living is less
than that in the country of the obligor's habitual residence. And where the
claimant's cost of living is greater than that of the obligor, the primary responsi-
bility to meet those marginal excess costs (if necessary including the possibility
of imputing income and demanding optimum performance) would be placed at
the door of the person whose move produced the cost of living differential.
Finally, in the American context with its established guideline structure,
recognition of the diverse pressures outlined above in the international context
may be difficult unless the deviation criteria permitted by the guidelines are
sufficiently flexible to accommodate multi-country related problems.
Additionally, and in particular, American courts must be sensitized to the need
to be more receptive to arguments for deviation where foreign countries are
involved, and in the process to resist the appeal of arguments of judicial
efficiency and simplicity that follow from rote application of the guidelines
themselves.
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REMARKS ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST
TERRORISTS AND ROGUE STATE
COLLABORATORS
Vincent J. Vitkowsky*
SYNoPsiS: State practice and patterns of cooperation over the last forty-five
years have led to the development of rules of customary international law
governing the use of force, in anticipatory self-defense, against terrorists and
rogue state collaborators. Although the earlier general rules may have
prohibited states from using force except in anticipation of an imminent attack,
in more recent practice, the imminence standard has changed. States have
initiated and cooperated in the use of force to extend self-defense to instances
in which the possibility of an attack is not imminent, but merely expected.
These actions are based on an assessment of the following factors:
1) The protection of nationals;
2) The probability of an attack;
3) The magnitude of potential harm;
4) The need to disrupt terrorist planning and activities; and
5) The need to eliminate safe havens.
REMARKS
This presentation is a case study on the application of customary
international law to a specific issue, the use of force, in anticipatory self
defense, against terrorists and rogue state collaborators.
Some of the hard questions that arise on terrorism issues come from the
strain of trying to impose traditional legal structures on new threats. The
Administration's choice is war law, the law of armed conflict. Its critics prefer
a blend of criminal law and humanitarian law. But another way to think about
it is that the rules are developing through customary international law, as
reflected in the conduct, and patterns of cooperation, of the states most actively
* Vincent J. Vitkowsky is a partner with Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge LLP in New York
City, focusing on litigation and international commercial arbitration. He is a member of the Committee on
the Formation of Customary International Law of the American Branch of the International Law Association.
The views expressed in these remarks are his own. He received his B.A. in 1977 from Northwestern
University and his J.D. in 1980 from the Cornell Law School.
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concerned with the threat. I will suggest that this is producing norms which are
reasonable adaptations and extensions of past norms--even though they are
inconsistent with the conventional wisdom, derived from the so-called Caroline
standard. I will invite you to consider the argument and push back.
We should start with the central tension in customary international law,
which is that it can be created by being broken. As Justice Jackson said at the
beginning of the Nuremberg Trials, "every custom has its origin in some single
act .... Innovations and revisions in international law are brought about by the
action of governments designed to meet a change in circumstances."'
In today's jargon, there is always a first move to a paradigm shift. If a
state takes an action that modifies or contravenes international law, the rest of
the world may or may not respond. If the action is accepted, then arguably, a
new norm has emerged.
Let's go to the United Nations Charter, and the general prohibition on the
use of force in Article 2(4). It says: "[a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."2
There's an exception for actions authorized by the Security Council, which
is rarely invoked, except for after-the-fact peacekeeping operations.
There's another, vastly more meaningful exception, which appears in
Article 51, which says that: "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member ....
There are serious scholars from across the ideological spectrum who
conclude that Article 51 recognizes one form of self-defense, i.e., in response
to an armed attack, but also recognizes the more general pre-existing right of
self-defense in customary international law. That's why the word "inherent"
was used.
The International Court of Justice has never addressed Article 51 directly.
Judge Schwebel, in his dissent in the Nicaragua case, is the only Judge to speak
to it. He said Article 51 does not authorize force "if, and only if, an armed
attack occurs," but rather there remains a general right under customary
international law. 4
1. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, Report
of June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 178, 187 (1945).
2. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
3. U.N. Charter art. 51.
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 347 (June 27) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Schwebel).
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And in any event, in a consent-based system of international law, no
meaningful definition of the right of self-defense can be made without reference
to the actual conduct of states.
Most of you will be familiar with the so-called Caroline Standard. ' In
1837, the British were crushing a rebellion in Canada. An informal militia from
New York used the steamboat Caroline to transport men and material to rebels
in Canada. In a night raid, British forces captured and destroyed the steamboat
in port in New York, and killed an American in the process. One of the British
officers was arrested and threatened with prosecution, but was released
following an exchange of correspondence between Secretary of State Daniel
Webster and British Special Minister Lord Ashburton. In the correspondence,
Webster said that the use of force should be confined to cases in which the
"necessity of self-defence, [is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation," and that nothing "unreasonable or
excessive" should be done.'
One aspect of this case is especially interesting. The British launched a
deliberate, planned raid, at a time and place of their choice, against intermittent
hostile acts. This is, on its face. inconsistent with the words "instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
To get around that, Lord Ashburton asserted that the intention was to seize the
Caroline in British waters, but the ship was not where it was expected to be.
Instead, it was docked on the American side, and the British captain made a
decision to forge ahead. This shows that even as the Caroline test was being
established, it was being interpreted creatively.
Based primarily on this test, most commentators describe the commonly




4) Exhaustion of peaceful options.
As I am about to show, these requirements have been modified substantially by
state practice in the last forty-five years.
I'll start with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the U.S. naval blockade.
The Security Council never reached the question of self-defense, even though
5. Of the many recitations of the Caroline Incident, one of the most thoughtful, nuanced and
comprehensive is Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory Self-Defense in Contemporary
International Law, 1:2 MISKOLC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (2004).
6. Id. at 110 citing Letter of Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Special Minister Ashburton (Apr.
24, 1841), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm#web2 (last
visted Mar. 17, 2007)..
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it did not authorize the blockade. Even states that opposed the blockade did not
denounce it. This was the beginning of a much more elastic concept of
imminence and necessity than that set by the Caroline test.
With one exception, I will not review the actions of Israel, because they
are taken in a context that is sui generis. But one action is noteworthy because
of the broad principle it established. This was the 1976 Israeli Rescue in
Entebbe, Uganda. An Air France plane was hijacked and forced to land in
Entebbe. The hijackers demanded the release of pro-Palestinian terrorists, and
threatened to kill the hostages. Idi Amin, dictator of Uganda, did nothing.
Israeli commandos landed, stormed the plane, and killed the highjackers.
Israel claimed that international law allowed it to use force to protect its
nationals in another state, if the government in that state was unwilling or
unable to do so. There was a draft U.N. resolution condemning the violation
of Uganda's territorial integrity, and requiring Israel to pay compensation for
damages, but the Security Council never voted on it.
This decisively extended the right of self-defense to include the protection
of nationals abroad. For example, even France has used force for this purpose
at least five times.
In 1986, the United States responded to a series of terrorist attacks by
bombing specific targets in Libya's command and control structure. The
United States claimed it was acting in anticipatory self-defense against future
attacks, consistent with Article 51. 8 The U.S. bombers flew over British
airspace, which I remember vividly, because I was taking depositions in London
at the time. There were security concerns throughout London for weeks. The
United States, Great Britain, France, Australia and Denmark vetoed a proposed
Security Council condemnation.
This was clearly a paradigm shift in state thinking. Past attacks were used
as evidence of the likelihood of future attacks. There is no reason why
intelligence reports would not have served the same purpose.
In 1993, in response to compelling evidence that Iraq attempted to
assassinate George H.W. Bush, cruise missiles were fired at Iraq's Intelligence
Service Headquarters. The United States-and this was President
Clinton-again relied on Article 51, even though the response was two months
after the assassination attempt. Germany and Japan expressed support. The
Arab League expressed "extreme regret," but the Security Council rejected
Iraq's plea for a condemnation. The General Assembly took no action.
One could argue that this extended the right of self-defense to the period
following an attempted attack on nationals.
7. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 58 (Grove Press 2005) (2005).
8. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, I PUB. PAPERS
499 (Apr. 16, 1986).
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In 1998, terrorists bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The
United States fired cruise missiles on six terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan, and a facility in Sudan believed to be used to produce chemical
weapons. President Clinton expressly invoked Article 51, saying that "[t]hese
strikes were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly
identified terrorist threat." 9 Great Britain, France and Germany were all
consulted before the strikes, and all agreed. Each made concurring public
statements. A few states denounced the strikes, but most remained silent. The
Security Council took no formal action, nor did the General Assembly.
This was another important development, arguably supporting the use of
force against states that harbor or otherwise enable terrorists.
2001 Afghanistan: Following 9/11, a Security Council Resolution
recognized the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with the U.N.
Charter. Troops were deployed against the Taliban in Afghanistan by twenty-
seven states. This time, the use of force extended to Regime Change, and it
decisively extended the right of self-defense to include force against countries
that provide a safe haven for terrorist groups that have already struck.
2003 Iraq: I don't want to make this about Iraq, certainly not in this room.
But I will note that even though Canada, France and Germany opposed the war,
they left their airspace open to U.S. military aircraft. The coalition included
thirty-three states. (Compare this to the coalition in the Korean War, which
included only sixteen states.) And as controversial as this was, it cannot be said
that it found no support in past state practice.
So that's the history. Let's compare it to the theory.
The conventional wisdom makes a distinction between two kinds of self-
defense: pre-emptive, which is intended to stop an imminent attack; and
preventive, which is intended to stop a possible attack. The first is permissible,
but the second is not, because of the lack of temporal imminence, or at least
that's the argument.
But in practice, states have not focused on temporal imminence. Rather,
they focus on:
1) The protection of nationals;
2) The probability of an attack;
3) The magnitude of potential harm;
4) The need to disrupt terrorist planning and activities; and
5) The need to eliminate safe havens.
9. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1464 (Aug. 21, 1998).
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Of these, probability is the most difficult to assess, because that assessment
must, by necessity, be based on imperfect information concerning capability
and intent.
In the real world, states have acted in ways that can only seriously be
understood as preventive self-defense. There has been no definitive rejection
of these actions, so a substantial argument can be made that there is no current
controlling norm prohibiting preventive self-defense.
Let me anticipate some questions that you may have. First, Article 51
recognizes the inherent right of self-defense, as of the time of the Charter. But
can the Charter be modified by subsequent state practice? There are several
arguments that it can. First, any "inherent" right must by definition be applied
on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis, with no bright lines, and will inevitably
evolve over time. Next is the doctrine of desuetude, which recognizes that
treaties may become ineffective as a result of non-observance. A third
argument is that the circumstances in place at the time the U.N. Charter was
drafted do not exist. For example:
1) The intended safeguard against unlawful threats of force, which was
a muscular Security Council, with an enforcement apparatus, never
materialized;
2) Modern methods of intelligence collection make it unnecessary to
wait for an actual attack in order to make a good guess about hostile
intent;
3) WMD can make the first blow devastating; and
4) Terrorist organizations of global reach were simply unknown when
the Charter was drafted.' 0
Even the venerable Professor Franck has argued that, like any foundational
instrument, over time the Charter has been construed to conform to evolving
state practice. He has written that the emergence of the threat of global
terrorism, especially combined with the development of weapons of mass
destruction by rogue states, has made it imperative that there be changes in the
way the Charter is construed."
Finally, and most importantly, it simply makes no sense to call something
a rule of law, in a consent-based system of international law, when states do not
follow it.
As an example of how these dynamics have worked in another context,
let's look at the use of force for humanitarian intervention, as reflected in the
10. See Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, THE
WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.
11. Thomas M. Franck, Preemption, Prevention and Anticipatory Self-Defense: New Law
Regarding Recourse to Force?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 425, 432 (2003-2004).
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1999 Bombings of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro. Any legal justification for
the bombings has to be based on a theory outside the U.N. Charter. The
bombings never received Security Council authorization. Yet nineteen NATO
democracies, representing 780 million people, participated.
The United States refused to provide any legal justification. Reportedly,
when British Foreign Secretary Cook told U.S. Secretary of State Albright of
problems "with our lawyers," she told him to "get new lawyers."' 2 Ultimately,
many liberal internationalists argued that state practice can amend the U.N.
Charter.
To anticipate a second question, since there have been at least some
objections to the state actions I've described, is there really a customary norm?
The response is that youjust cannot realistically expect unanimity. Even in the
academic formulation, interim rules become customary international law once
a large enough number of states having an interest in them act in accordance
with them. I once asked Balthazar Garzon, the Spanish prosecutor who leads
the world in successful terrorist prosecutions, how he did that, in the absence
of agreement on the definition of terrorism. We were working through
interpreters, but as best as I can tell, his answer came down to "customary
international law." He said: "[t]here will always be differences, but all custom
exists in that eighty percent of commonality among nations." To which I might
add, the commonality among nations that actually use force, because for the
others, the issues are truly academic.
Since 9/11, the United States has made it an official policy to recognize the
realities of state practice by announcing an "emerging threat" standard. The
attack need not be imminent, or even overtly threatened, but merely expected.
The National Security Strategies of September 2002"3 and March 200614 set
forth the rationale. In essence, they say that "[w]e must adapt the concept of
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries...,"15
and "[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack."' 6
This position has been heavily criticized, but I would suggest that it
actually breaks little, if any, new ground. It is merely an adaptation of the
existing rules as applied in practice.
12. BYERS, supra note 7, at 47.
13. George W. Bush, Prevent our Enemies from Threatening us, our Allies, and our Friends with
Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 1, 2002) in The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, Sept. 2002, at 14-16, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (last visited Feb. 7,2007).
14. See George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, Mar.
2006, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
15. Bush, supra note 13, at 15.
16. Bush, supra note 14, at 18.
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Where I come out is that there is at least implicit agreement to the
standard, as I've described it. The disagreements come from the application of
the standard to particular facts and circumstances, especially in the weighing
of the magnitude of potential harm and the probability of attack. And in a given
case, reasonable minds might indeed differ.
But one thing is clear: the "imminence" standard is meaningless as against
terrorists. Preparation is covert. There are no clear indications of when an
attack is about to occur. There are no troop movements, only individuals with
backpacks. At best, there is only imperfect and sometimes contradictory
intelligence.
In today's world, the Caroline standard makes no sense. Is there anyone
in this room who wants the government to wait to save New York until the
danger is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment
for deliberation?" At times-and we will not all agree on precisely when-this
will involve a preventive attack on an intentional or unintentional host state.
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International law teaching combines the worst aspects of sex and the
weather. Everyone thinks they are an expert; they complain about problems but
do nothing to improve the situation. This is an exaggeration, but, in spite of
protestations to the contrary, the teaching of international law does not seem to
be a major interest of professional associations devoted to international law or,
for that matter, to most professors who teach the subject.
In some ways, the last fifteen years have seen a marked increase in
discussions about the teaching of international law. The American Society of
International Law (ASIL) has an interest group on teaching.' The International
Law Association (ILA) has established a committee on the Teaching of
International Law.2 ASIL President, Anne-Marie Slaughter, established a
* Distinguished Professor of Political Science and International Law, The Behrend College, The
Pennsylvania State University, Erie, PA 16563 U.S.A.
I. The Interest Group has existed for more than a decade. This is the official description of its
role:
The Teaching International Law Interest Group provides a forum for those involved
in or interested in teaching international law to discuss approaches, methods, and new
techniques taking place both in the United States and abroad. The Group operates
under the premise that effective teaching leads to increased public awareness and a
greater understanding of international law. Although innovative new practices are
often highlighted, standard approaches are also examined in order to keep them fresh
and effective.
The Group has recently addressed topic areas such as curriculum and pedagogies in
both doctrinal and non-doctrinal courses, requiring international law courses, infusion
curriculum, and international law certificate programs within the JD program. The
Group addresses these topics through discussions and workshops, as well as through
co-sponsorship of international conferences.
See The American Society of International Law, available at http://www.asil.org/teachingillindex.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2007).
2. The Committee has approximately thirty members and alternates and has participated actively
in all ISL Bi-Annual Meetings since 2000. 1 serve as rapporteur for the committee. See International Law
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"teaching initiative" that held two workshops: Workshop One, held on
Saturday, April 3, 2004 in Washington, D.C.-sponsored by ASIL, Teaching
Initiative; ILA Committee on the Teaching of International Law, Institute for
International Law & Politics, Georgetown University; Workshop Two,
Monday, August 23, 2004, Faculty of Law of the University of Potsdam,
Germany-sponsored by ILA Committee on the Teaching of International Law;
ASIL, Teaching Initiative; Faculty of Law, University of Potsdam.
Both were successful, drew good attendance, and discussed a wide range
of issues important to teachers from the content of examinations, information
age teaching techniques, to the place of international law in the curriculum.
Given successes like these workshops, it is tempting to declare that the
condition of international law teaching is good. I do not accept this positive
assessment. Rather, I believe there are institutional, systemic barriers to
significant improvement in international law teaching. Unless these can be
overcome, we might miss a once-in-a-generation opportunity.
Until fifteen years ago, my experience with international law teaching was
fairly typical. International law always had been my principal research interest
and occupied perhaps a quarter of my teaching. I developed certain impressions
about international law teaching from teaching courses once or twice per year.
In no way was my knowledge of international law teaching systematic,
developed as it was from my own experiences and from occasional discussions
with colleagues.
Things changed for me in 1989, when the Ford Foundation seemed eager
to fund a survey of international law teaching via a grant to the ASIL. I was the
only person active in ASIL with interests in international law and survey
research, so I got the job of organizing, developing, and administering the
survey that resulted in Teaching InternationalLaw in the 1990s.3 The first step
in the survey was drafting a questionnaire that would be sent to thousands of
professors, academic administrators, and even some students to assess their
experiences with international law teaching. Two points about this experience
illustrate both the success of the survey and why the project could not be
replicated today. Soon after the project began, I convened a group-mostly
from the project advisory committee-that met for two and a half hours after
an ASIL annual meeting to discuss the details of drafts of the questionnaires.
Those attending included: Goler Butcher, Charlotte Ku, Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Lori Damrosch, Igor Lukashuk, Edwin Smith, Abram Chayes, Michael Molitor,
Association, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/htmlVlayoutcommittee.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).




Louis Sohn, Richard Edwards, Yasuaki Onuma, Tullio Treves, Louis Henkin,
Alain Pellet, Daniel Turp, Keith Highet, Bruno Simma, Stephen Zamora.4
We agreed on different questionnaires for each of the several con-
stituencies, and sent out 1,500 questionnaires with a return rate of more than
fifty percent.5 In 2006, I do not think it would be possible to get this many
leading scholars of international law to meet to discuss a questionnaire dealing
with teaching. And, in the Internet age-when we are bombarded with e-mail
questionnaires-neither would it be feasible to get such a high return rate.
Carrying out this survey broadened and deepened my interest in the
teaching of international law. I moved beyond the anecdotal and, somewhat
oxymoronically, made teaching one of my research interests.6
The survey found high levels of interest among faculty and students; both
constituencies like teaching and studying the subject. Administrators in
political science admit to a prejudice against international law because it is too
normative and not amenable to the quantitative methods so prevalent in political
science.7 Law school professors think international law should be taught better
and to more students but, generally, oppose requiring any international law.8
"Only 23% of respondents would require the course."9
Fast forward to 2006, let's start with the good news. The confluence of
three broad factors provides an excellent opportunity.
The Internet has matured so that teachers and students can communicate
easily, comfortably, and inexpensively-almost irrespective of physical loca-
tion. This makes it possible to draw students from many locations into the same
course-not to mention the almost infinite range of audio visual enhancements
now readily available for classroom teachers. However, my impression after
talking with dozens of colleagues is that new modes of teaching are possible but
often not sustainable because of the huge amount of time and effort needed.
The real test of the Internet will be feasibility.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 141-87.
6. In addition to the aforementioned book, I have published: JOHN KING GAMBLE & CHRISTOPHER
C. JOYNER, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: APPROACHES AND PERSPECTIVES, (1997); John Gamble and
Natalie Shields, International Legal Scholarship: A Perspective on Teaching and Publishing, 39 J. oF
LEGAL EDUCATION., 39-46 (1989); John Gamble, Teaching ofInternational Law: Innovative Techniques,
in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT A TIME OF MOMENTOUS CHANGE
367-70 (1994); John Gamble, An Introductory Course: Clear/er Solutions: The Case for a Bare-bones
Course in International Law (BBCiIL), in 4 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 208-14
(2002).
7. Survey, supra note 3, at 132-33.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. However, younger faculty seemed much more positively disposed towards a requirement.
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On October 6, 2006, Harvard Law School announced a new international
law requirement.'" While this is not as sweeping a development as initially
inferred, it may change the thinking about U.S. international legal education.
Harvard Dean Elena Kagan said, "This marks a major step forward in our
efforts to develop a law school curriculum for the twenty-first century.""
However, a single survey course is not required; instead, "each student will take
one of three specially crafted courses introducing global legal systems and
concerns-Public International Law, International Economic Law, and Com-
parative Law."'" The result may be a sea of change in the quality and quantity
of international law taught in the 190 law schools in the U.S. At least in the
short run, this should mean heightened interest in international law teaching.
During the last fifty years, political science has been a difficult environ-
ment for international law. Most departments did not even teach the subject.
Research in international law tended to be discounted. That situation has
changed slowly, but drastically. International law is taught in more
departments, and research is more active than ever. The International Treaty
Research and Analysis Group (ITRAG) held a workshop October 12-14, 2006
at the University of Iowa. The meeting, organized by Professor Sara Mitchell,
was attended by almost thirty people. ' This would have been inconceivable a
10. Harvard Law School, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/10/06_
curriculum.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
11. Id.
12. Harvard provided this description of the new requirement:
From the beginning of law school, students should learn to locate what they are
learning about public and private law in the United States within the context of a
larger universe-global networks of economic regulation and private ordering, public
systems created through multilateral relations among states, and different and widely
varying legal cultures and systems. Accordingly, the Law School will develop three
foundation courses, each of which represents a door into the global sphere that
students will use as context for U.S. law. A course on public international law will
introduce students to the sources, institutions and procedures emerging over time
through the bilateral and multilateral arrangements among states as well as the
participation of nongovernmental actors. A course on international economic law will
introduce students to the network of economic regulation and private ordering
affecting commercial transactions, trade, banking and other systems for facilitating
and regulating economic relations around the globe. A third course, on comparative
law, will introduce students to one or more legal systems outside our own, to the
borrowing and transmission of legal ideas across borders and to a variety of
approaches to substantive and procedural law that are rooted in distinct cultures and
traditions. Students will be allowed to elect any one of these courses in the first year.
Id.
13. Shambaugh Conference, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Oct. 12-14,2006,
Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics, available at http://www.saramitchell.
org/shambaugh06.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
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decade ago. There is some excellent international law research-most quite
quantitative-being carried. The hope is that this research will lead to more
and better teaching within political science."
Given the present climate, I conclude the possibility exists for unprece-
dented synergy, innovation, and improvement in the teaching of international
law. However, I fear the deck is stacked against major changes. Two factors
conspire against the kind of change that is needed.
I. REWARD SYSTEM IN U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
Rewards for faculty are stacked overwhelmingly in favor of research, not
teaching. I have hundreds of friends and acquaintances with various kinds of
honorific titles connected to their faculty appointments. Only one of them,
Professor J. Martin Rochester, has the word "teaching" or "teacher" in his title;
his title is "Distinguished Teaching Professor."' 5 The difficulty is compounded
by the fact that research accomplishments are much easier to measure than is
teaching effectiveness. If a faculty member has published a number of articles
in significant journals, research proficiency is a fairly safe assumption.
Teaching is much harder to evaluate and measure. Most institutions in the U.S.
and Canada now use some kind of course evaluation questionnaire (CEQ) by
which students assess the quality of the instruction they have received. At their
best, CEQs may provide increased accountability, but they are not a panacea.
CEQs are useful principally as a measure of student satisfaction. They are
an imprecise, broad-brush measure of a phenomenon that is difficult to assess
in the first place. There are other ways to judge teaching. If these are used
judiciously along with CEQs, we will come closer to making a fair assessment
of the quality of this art called teaching. We must remember that CEQs are a
sundial, not a stopwatch, and higher education has many cloudy days.' 6
I suspect the following dynamic occurs fairly often. Most rewards faculty
receives accrue because of research accomplishments. Teaching is difficult to
assess, save for simplistic, inadequate CEQs. The most rational behavior for
most of the faculty is to teach well enough to get reasonable CEQ scores.
Innovation in teaching is discouraged because, in the short run, most change
tends to lower CEQ scores. This creates the scenario where faculty
concentrates on research, seeking the path of least resistance and relatively high
CEQ scores for their teaching. As these faculty members receive tenure and
14. Id. For a list of papers and text of many, see Professor Mitchell's website, available at
http://www.saramitchell.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
15. University of Missouri at St. Louis, see Dept. of Political Science, available at
http://www.umsl.edu/-polisci/faculty/profiles.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
16. John Gamble, The Sundial/Stopwatch Dilemma, 12 NEW EDUCATION 59 (1990) (on file with
author).
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become more senior, they have the opportunity to adjust their teaching duties
away from large introductory courses towards advanced, smaller, much more
specialized seminars that often are far closer to their research interests. This is
not the climate where preeminent international law faculty will lobby the dean
for support in trying to devise the best, most creative survey course in
international law.
II. OUR MAJOR PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
Do NOT TAKE TEACHING SERIOUSLY
This may be biting the hand that feeds me. Both the ILA and ASIL have
shown token interest in teaching with, respectively, a Committee on teaching
and an Interest Group. But neither has prospered. The ILA Committee has
trouble getting branches to appoint members. Reports of the Committee are not
taken seriously and, because they do not fit the usual ILA mold, often do not get
published. Teaching is fundamentally different from other ILA foci, e.g., "the
regime of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,"' 7 and has not found
its niche. The ASIL Interest Group has conducted some activities, but overall
has not been particularly active. Teaching usually is deemed not sexy enough
for the ASIL Annual Meeting. The last plenary session on teaching at an ASIL
Annual Meeting was in 1991."8 This was possible only because of the
insistence of one of the program co-chairs (me). 400 people attended, including
Yale Professor Myres McDougal. Professor McDougal-eighty-five years old
at the time-sat in the front row, appeared to be sleeping, but asked the first and
best question. I had hoped for a resurgence of interest at ASIL, but it has been
very difficult. Executive directors generally are supportive of teaching; most
ASIL presidents have not made it a high priority.
The opportunity exists for a major resurgence in interest in international
law teaching. I think this argument can be made, although, so far, it does not
seem to have held sway. In my opinion, two of the major problems facing
professional associations like the ASIL and the ILA are appealing to both major
membership constituencies, professors, and practitioners, and dealing with
specialization and, ultimately fragmentation, e.g., will an American Society of
International Economic Law develop because economic law experts feel they
are getting short changed by ASIL?
17. See List of Committees, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/html/DISPLAYCOMM_
DETAILS.ASP?ID=33&COMM=Outer+Continental+Shelf&type=IC (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
18. Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
Roundtable on the Teaching of International Law, American Society of International Law, April 17-20, 1991,
85 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 102.
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A creative, ambitious rededication to international law teaching could
address both of these problems. In dozens of conversations with ASIL and ILA
members, I have been struck by the fact that all members have a common
interest in international law teaching as students, professors-or more
immediately-as the vehicle by which new and talented people are drawn to
international law. Further, efforts to develop a good, efficient, effective survey
course in international law should have broad appeal. More focus on teaching
might also ameliorate the rift among sub-specialties. Improved teaching
techniques and strategies should be of interest to all subspecialties. Sub-fields,
e.g., human rights law, law of the sea, and trade law, cannot be taught
efficiently if students lack a basic grounding in international law. How can
professors teach about the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
procedures if students have no prior knowledge of dispute settlement modes
used in international law?
Where do we begin? First, we should seek practical, focused approaches
that yield tangible results. With all due respect to my friend, the late Judge
Manfred Lachs, an expansive approach to teaching such as that advocated in
Judge Lachs' book is not the way to generate sustained interest. 19 I suggest that
a university join forces with a professional association to create an institute for
the improvement of international law teaching (triple ILT). This must be a
neutral forum, not favoring any particular approach or orthodoxy.2" It would
have to accommodate the fact that we teachers want to be assisted, not coerced,
and often are suspicious of those offering to help us to teach better. Initially,
I envision a website, organized by important topics. Faculty could visit to get
advice, strategies, or anecdotes for teaching a particular subject. Subsequently,
they could contribute to the site-making the endeavor interactive, almost
organic. In the overall scheme of things, this task is not difficult. The
problem-not surprisingly-is finding people with the determination, time,
energy, and influence to make it happen. Of course, a sizeable grant would
help, as would explicit expressions of support from officials of ASIL and the
ILA.
19. See MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1982). I think Judge Lachs
would agree with my assessment. In many long conversations, he explained to me that his book was an
attempt to express his view of teachers integrating their efforts in research and teaching.
20. For example, if such a website were dominated by opposition to the war in Iraq, it would make
it harder to sustain and develop the site for use in the long-term.
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MOVING FROM SINGLE-SPECIES MANAGEMENT
TO ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN REGIONAL
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Howard S. Schiffinan*
Even though reference to the modem framework of ocean governance
begins with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS),' it certainly does not end there. Indeed, at the early part of the
Twenty-First Century we have a growing network of international organizations
and treaty regimes, and, of course, nation-states that play a role in ocean
governance. These actors are driven by a variety of objectives, most especially
the need to balance conservation and consumption of living marine resources.
In addition, in the Twenty-First Century those organizations tasked with
ocean governance, principally regional fisheries management organizations
(RFMOs), must satisfy a variety of stakeholders and constituents that range
well beyond the classic nation-state. These include environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), commercial interests, native aboriginal
users, as well as other conservation and management organizations.
Ocean governance is increasingly informed by a growing list of legal
concepts that are often ill-defined and difficult to apply in practice. These
include the Precautionary Approach, the duty to cooperate and the duty to apply
the best available scientific evidence. Another of these new guiding principles
is the duty to apply ecosystem-based conservation and management.
Ecosystem-based management has steadily gained currency in recent
years. This is especially so since the drafting of the UN Fish Stocks Treaty in
the mid-1990s. 2  While ecosystem management is hard to define, it is
essentially a more holistic approach to ocean governance. It proceeds from the
notion that human actions such as fisheries and pollution have consequences up
and down the food chain. Fisheries practices, for example, affect the entire
* Howard S. Schiffnan, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D., Director and Clinical Associate Professor, M.S.
Program in Global Affairs, New York University, School of Continuing and Professional Studies.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. G.A. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Fish
Stocks Treaty].
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ecosystem and are not simply limited to target species. Ecosystem management
takes into account the wide-range of horizontal and vertical ecological
relationships that exist between and among marine organisms.
The much more classic approach is "single species" management. In
single species management an RFMO will set a catch quota for tuna or cod in
a certain region of the ocean. Under a single species management model, an
RFMO may also adopt measures relating to the reduction of unintended catch
(bycatch), but rarely does much more than that. The thinking behind single
species management is not wrong per se, but is quite linear. Reduced to its
most basic form, single species management would dictate that where there are
too few cod, less cod will be fished. Where cod are abundant, more will be
fished.
The evolution toward an ecosystem-based approach with respect to the
conservation and management of ocean resources is grounded in UNCLOS.
Article 61 of UNCLOS, entitled "Conservation of the Living Resources" of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), recognizes that proper conservation and the
determination of Maximum Sustainable Yield should take into account "the
interdependence of stocks."3 Article 61(4) requires coastal states to "take into
consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon
harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such
associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened."4 The equivalent language is found in Article 119
which is entitled, "Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas."5
More recently, ecosystem-based management was endorsed in the Food
and Agriculture Organization's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.6
Article 6.2 of the Code of Conduct provides:
Fisheries management should promote the maintenance of the quality,
diversity and availability of fishery resources in sufficient quantities
for present and future generations in the context of food security,
poverty alleviation and sustainable development. Management
measures should not only ensure the conservation of target species but
also of species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with
or dependent upon the target species.7
3. UNCLOS at art. 61.
4. Id. at art. 61(4).
5. Id. at art. 119.
6. Food and Agriculture Organization, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, U.N. Doc.
95/20/Rev/I (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878eOO.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2006).
7. Id. at art. 6.2 (emphasis added).
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Other key articles of the Code of Conduct reinforce this commitment to
ecosystem management.8 These articles demonstrate the growing concern for
habitat protection, reduction of bycatch, and recognition of the impacts of
fishery practices on associated and dependent species.
Ecosystem management also flows naturally from obligations to preserve
biodiversity found in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).9 Most
directly, ecosystem management is suggested by obligations to achieve in-situ
conservation of biological resources.'"
In terms of the application of the ecosystem approach, it is undeniable that
there is considerable disagreement among states, policy makers, and scientists
over its precise meaning and application. Even so, there is general agreement
that it includes such matters as:
1) Habitat protection (this might include pollution control and even
the duty to address global warming);
2) The reduction of bycatch through unnecessarily destructive
fishing practices; and
3) The increase of scientific study to better understand the complex
biological relationships that exist in the marine environment.
RFMOs, which are sometimes the first and last line of defense in high seas
governance, are today adopting recommendations and resolutions that value the
wider marine ecosystem. In other words, RFMOs are moving beyond the more
traditional setting of catch quotas and total allowable catch. The regime that
is most often credited with an application of ecosystem management is the
Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR)." The CCAMLR treaty entered into force in 1982 and is one of
several Agreements that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System. 2 Unlike many
other agreements, the CCAMLR Treaty embraces ecosystem management in the
text of the treaty itself. Article 2(3) of the CCAMLR Treaty provides:
3. Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this
Convention applies shall be conducted in accordance with the
8. See e.g., id. at arts. 2(i), 6.6, 6.8, 7.6.9, 12.5 and 12.10.
9. Convention on Biological Diversity, openedfor signature June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DP/1l30/7,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
10. See id. at art. 8.
11. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 1329
U.N.T.S. 47 (entered into force Apr. 7 1982) [hereinafter CCAMLR Treaty].
12. Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, available at
http://www.ccamlr.org (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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provisions of this Convention and with the following principles of
conservation:
(a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to
levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this
purpose its size should not be allowed to fall below a level close to
that which ensures the greatest net annual increment;
(b) maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested,
dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living
resources and the restoration of depleted populations to the levels
defined in sub-paragraph (a) above. 3
Discussions of CCAMLR and its commitment to ecosystem management
are often sidetracked by discussions of its relative success or failure with regard
to its management of its most visible resource: the Patagonian Toothfish, more
commonly known as the Chilean Seabass. Even before its management of
Toothfish, CCAMLR was actively engaged in the management of krill, which
is a key component of the Antarctic food chain. 4
CCAMLR often draws criticism for the poor status of Antarctic Toothfish
stocks. This status, however, is more likely attributable to Illegal, Unreported,
and Unregulated fishing in its convention area than any failure of ecosystem-
based management. Questions about the Toothfish aside, CCAMLR deserves
praise for adopting ecosystem-based management as one of its guiding
principles.
In both CCAMLR and other RFMOs where ecosystem management is
applied, important questions must be answered before it can be fully imple-
mented. First, how can we develop a complete list of interested constituencies
who will have a say in the application of the ecosystem approach? In addition
to scientists, policy-makers, and industry representatives, shall we also include
environmental NGOs? If so, who shall determine which ones have earned a
right to participate? Can we practically take into account the consumers of the
resource, including traditional and aboriginal users?
Another significant hurdle that must be overcome is how to address
problems presented by scientific uncertainty, and the implementation of the
Precautionary Approach into ecosystem-based decision-making. Implementing
the Precautionary Approach is a significant challenge in the more linear model
of single-species management. These challenges are only multiplied when
13. Id. at art. 2(3).
14. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND INTERNATIONAL REPORT, POLICY PROPOSALS AND OPERATIONAL
GUIDANCE FOR ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 18 (2006), available at
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/ebmreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
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decision-makers must factor in potential consequences to associated and
dependent species as required by ecosystem-based management.
While it is undeniable that as RFMOs evolve they are progressively
adopting ecosystem-based management as a guiding principle, there is little
doubt that we are moving towards this approach as a normative concept in
ocean governance in the Twenty-First Century. Even so, substantial questions
must be answered before it can be implemented successfully. While the
concept of ecosystem management is laudatory and optimism about what it can
potentially accomplish is justified, it remains to be seen whether or not it
provides a superior model for ocean governance.
